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Change? Yes, we must change, only show me the Theory, and I
will be at the barricades, show me the book of the next Beautiful
Theory, and I promise you these blind eyes will see again, just to
read it, to devour that text. Show me the words that will reorder
the world, or else keep silent.'
In this Article, Professor Krieger examines the implications of
social cognition and social identity theory for the debate over affirma-
tive action. In Part I, she explores the extent to which insights from
those fields support the claim that affirmative action preferences exacer-
bate intergroup tensions and perpetuate certain subtle forms of inter-
group bias. Finding qualified support for that view in both theoretical
models and empirical evidence, Part I concludes that at least certain
preferential forms of affirmative action may injure intergroup relations
in a variety of troubling ways.
Extending the analysis in Part II, Professor Krieger inquires
whether, absent preferential forms of affirmative action, remaining legal
and policy tools will suffice to control discrimination and prevent the
further segregation of American society. Part II concludes that these
remaining tools, which include a colorblindness model of nondiscrimi-
nation, reliance on an objective concept of merit, and the use of indi-
vidual disparate treatment adjudication as a primary law enforcement
tool, are unequal to the task. The misplaced confidence in these tools
often found among affirmative action opponents derives, Krieger sug-
gests, from a misunderstanding of the nature and sources of intergroup
bias, from a failure to recognize its subtlety and tendency to persist over
time, and from over-reliance on limited adjudicatory and regulatory
1. TONY KusmmNE, ANGELS IN AMERICA, PART 11: PERESTROIKA, Act I, Scene 1 (1994).
Perestroika (restructuring) was the term attached to Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts during the latter
half of the 1980s to dismantle the Soviet Union's command and control economy. The policy was
frequently criticized on the grounds that dismantling state controls before the institutions, norms, and
other structures required for a free market system had been developed would leave the Union
vulnerable to political, economic, and ultimately social chaos.
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approaches to address what is fundamentally a complex cultural prob-
lem.
Accordingly, Professor Krieger argues that we are not yet ready to
abandon preferential forms of affirmative action for the simple reason
that we have nothing adequate with which to replace them. Unless more
inclusive jurisprudential models of intergroup bias and new approaches
to reducing such bias are developed, the problems of discrimination
and inequality of opportunity can be expected to worsen in a post-
affirmative action environment. In her Conclusion, Krieger articulates a
set of first principles and constructs a general conceptual foundation for
the future development of such a broadened view.
INTRODUCTION
Here at the University of California at Berkeley, there was a sur-
real quality to November 6, 1996, the day after voters, in enacting
Proposition 209, elected to end affirmative action in California state
hiring, contracting, and education. The few protests that had been or-
ganized ended quickly and quietly. At the law school, students seemed
uncharacteristically subdued: quietly resigned-or quietly pleased. In the
newspapers that morning and on the mornings that followed, articles
about Texaco executives referring to their African-American employ-
ees as "niggers"2 and "black jelly beans" were oddly juxtaposed against
others in which Proposition 209's triumphant sponsors heralded a glo-
rious new era of truly equal opportunity and the long-awaited dawning
of a colorblind society.
Now, many months later and well into the first of Berkeley's
"post-affirmative action" years, the atmosphere here is no less strange.
On the first day of classes in 1997, the halls and courtyards swarmed
with television cameras and reporters, attempting, I noted with a sense
of irony, to identify the lone African-American member of Boalt Hall's
first "colorblind" class. We were no longer supposed to consider race,
but race was everywhere in these halls on that first morning of the new
school year.
The weeks that followed provided little respite. Three days after
classes commenced, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed a three judge panel's
2. I refer here not to those portions of certain tape recorded conversations that were
eventually deciphered as making reference to "Saint Nicholas," but rather to the comments of
Texaco Assistant Controller Jim Wooley, as described in deposition testimony of Texaco manager
Michael Moccio and reported in the New York Times. When asked by Mr. Moccio what he should do
about a race discrimination claim filed by an African-American employee, Mr. Wooley reportedly
replied, "I'd fire her black ass." When Mr. Moccio protested that firing the employee would
constitute unlawful retaliation, Mr. Wooley rejoined, "I guess we treat niggers differently down
here." Kurt Eichenwald, The Two Faces of Texaco, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1996, at Section 3, Page 1.
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prior decision upholding Proposition 2091 and refused to consider its
constitutionality en banc.4 The following Tuesday, the same court
denied plaintiffs motion for an emergency stay pending petition to the
Supreme Court, and Proposition 209 became law. Eight days later, the
same Ninth Circuit panel that originally upheld 209 ruled that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits not only the use of overt preferences, but
also requirements that government contractors make "good faith
efforts" to recruit women and minority subcontractors.' On November
4, 1997, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Coalition for Economic
Equity v. Wilson.7 The legal fight over Proposition 209 was over.
If history is any guide, the trend started in California will spread to
other states and to the national stage in the months ahead. The 10 5th
Congress witnessed the introduction of three separate bills that would
have "nationalized" Proposition 209,8 and, events in Houston notwith-
standing,9 many States are contemplating similar legislation. 0
But before proceeding further down this road, it might be wise to
pause and ask some hard questions. As a society, are we really ready to
abandon preferential forms of affirmative action?" What can we expect
3. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997).
4. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
5. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 1997)
6. See Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 1997).
7. See 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
8. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1997, S. 46 105th Cong. (1997); Civil Rights Act of 1997,
H.R. 1909, 105th Cong. (1997); Racial and Gender Preference Reform Act, H.R. 2079, 105th Cong.
(1997).
9. On November 4, 1997, voters in Houston, Texas defeated Measure A, which would have
prohibited affirmative action in city hiring and contracting. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Voters Turn
Back Affirmative Action Ban Much Like the One in California, N.Y. TuinEs, Nov. 5, 1997, at A24.
10. At last count, at least 26 states were contemplating similar legislation. See Harriet Chiang,
U.S. High Court Allows Prop. 209 to Remain in Effect, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 5, 1997, at A17. Among the
most successful so far is Initiative 200 in Washington, dubbed the "Civil Rights Initiative" by
supporters. The initiative, which was certified in January after supporters submitted more than
280,000 signatures, goes next to the state legislature and then on to the voters of Washington. See
David Postman, Enough Valid Signatures Certified for Initiative 200: Proposal to End Affirmative
Action in Government Goes to Legislature, SEATTLE TIMEs, Jan. 21, 1998, at B2. Colorado is
expected to have an initiative similar to Proposition 209 on its November 1998 ballot. See Beverly
Vasquez, Colorado Unity Defends Affirmative Action, DENVER Bus. J., Nov. 28, 1997, at 15A. In
Georgia and Florida, opponents of affirmative action have not enjoyed similar success. In Georgia
the leading proposal against affirmative action has faltered in a committee of the state House since
1995. See David Pendered, '98 Georgia Legislature: Anti-Affirmative Action Advocates See '98 as
Theirs, THE ATLANTA CONSTIT., Jan. 15, 1998, at C4. Supporters of the Florida initiative modeled
after Prop. 209 have collected only one percent of the votes needed to place it on the ballot. See
Gady A. Epstein, Anti-Affirmative Action Petition Founders, TAMPA Tma., Dec. 30, 1997, at Metro 1.
11. Affirmative action does not necessarily involve the preferential use of race, gender, or
ethnicity in selection decision making. As originally defined, affirmative action simply requires
organizations to ensure that their selection procedures are free of subtle forms of discrimination and
that they take "extra" or "affirmative" steps to increase the representation of previously under-
represented groups in their applicant pools. See U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Statement on
Affirmative Action (Report No. 54, 1977). For ease of expression, I will at times use the phrase
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to occur with respect to intergroup relations, and with race relations in
particular, in a post-affirmative action environment? If affirmative
action is eliminated, will remaining policy tools prove adequate to
effectuate racial and gender equity and to prevent the resegregation of
American society? Will the idea of "colorblindness" suffice as a theo-
retical model for understanding what it means not to discriminate? Or
will we find instead that affirmative action actually served to mask a
"multiplicity of sins"--critical failings in our approach to intergroup
relations and serious defects in the tools available to make the equal
opportunity society a reality instead of a hazy, unattainable dream?
In the face of voter response, supporters of affirmative action too
face hard questions. If, as social scientists have shown, people's percep-
tions of fairness influence their attitudes and behaviors, and if, as the
vote on Proposition 209 reflects, large segments of the population view
racial preferences as unfair, is there not substantial reason to fear that
preferential forms of affirmative action might ultimately exacerbate
not only racial tensions, but also racial bias itself? However well-
intentioned, might preferences heighten intergroup tensions, reinforce
stereotyped notions of outgroup inferiority, and ultimately undermine
the moral authority of equal opportunity law?
Many have written about affirmative action. The issue can be
approached from a variety of disciplinary perspectives: legal, philo-
sophical, or political-theoretical, to name but a few. But whether sup-
portive or critical, and irrespective of the discipline from which they
derive, most treatments either explicitly advance or implicitly invoke a
set of essentially empirical claims. Some of these claims concern the
effect of affirmative action programs on beneficiaries or on patterns of
intergroup relations more generally. For example, affirmative action
opponents commonly argue that group preferences actually injure bene-
ficiaries, both by creating self-doubt and by provoking negative
responses in non-beneficiaries. Supporters of affirmative action, on the
other hand, dispute these claims, attacking the efficacy of an equal
treatment approach to equal opportunity and intergroup justice.
In this Article, I do not intend to evaluate the constitutional or
statutory validity of affirmative action preferences, nor to respond to
philosophical or political-theoretical arguments supporting or attacking
them. Rather, my effort here centers on a close examination of the
essentially empirical psychological claims around which much of the
debate revolves. This project strikes me as important for a number of
reasons.
"affirmative action" to refer to the overt, preferential use of group membership in selection decision
making. However, the reader should understand that affirmative action and the use of group-based
preferences are not coextensive.
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If we accept the premise that at least one important goal of civil
rights policy is to lessen the tendency toward intergroup strife inherent
in any diverse society, then one can assess the value of a particular
policy tool only in light of its expected effect on people's attitudes and
behaviors towards members of other social groups. Similarly, if we are
to eliminate preferential forms of affirmative action, we would be well-
advised to consider whether remaining legal policy tools, such as the
"colorblindness" approach to nondiscrimination, will adequately control
intergroup bias and ensure equality of opportunity for members of all
gender, ethnic, and racial groups. To make such assessments, one must
know something about the psychology of social perception and
judgment generally, and more particularly about social perception and
judgment in intergroup contexts. A civil rights policy uninformed by
relevant insights from social psychology may fall prey to the law of
unintended consequences.
In this Article, I will evaluate preferential forms of affirmative
action, and the "colorblindness" approach to nondiscrimination cham-
pioned by its opponents, through the lens of three sub-disciplines of
social psychology. The first, social cognition theory, concerns how pat-
terns of human cognition, while adaptive in many important respects,
lead to systematic errors which bias social perception and judgment in a
variety of predictable ways. The second, social justice theory, examines
the determinants and consequences of people's subjective judgments of
fairness. The third, social identity theory, seeks to describe and explain
how and why people tend to favor members of their own groups-even
when membership in those groups is based on trivial or arbitrary crite-
ria.
My exploration divides into two broad parts. Part I explores the
extent to which insights from cognitive social psychology reasonably
support arguments that affirmative action preferences exacerbate inter-
group tensions and perpetuate certain subtle forms of intergroup bias.
Such arguments are based on a variety of essentially empirical
claims, including: (a) that preferences lead to self-derogation and disaf-
fection among affirmative action beneficiaries; (b) that preferences
perpetuate negative stereotypes about beneficiary groups and retard the
process of stereotype change; (c) that preferences, by virtue of their
perceived unfairness, create intergroup hostility; and (d) that the use of
race, gender, or national origin in selection decision making makes
those categories more rather than less salient in social perception and
judgment.
Most of these hypotheses about affirmative action's negative
effects can be tested, and a good deal of empirical data exists to support
or refute them. After reviewing the relevant literature, and exploring
1998] 1257
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
both its implications and its limitations, Part I concludes that certain
preferential forms of affirmative action can be expected, at least under
some conditions, to injure intergroup relations in a variety of troubling
ways.
Part II inquires whether, absent preferential forms of affirmative
action, remaining policy tools would prove adequate to control dis-
crimination and prevent the further segregation of American society. It
concludes that these remaining tools, which include a colorblindness
model of nondiscrimination, an objective concept of merit, and indi-
vidualized adjudication as a primary policy enforcement tool, are
unequal to the task. In short, we still lack adequate tools for coping suc-
cessfully with the problems of intergroup competition and cooperation
in a pluralistic society.
I This failure, which I will argue has been masked to a certain extent
by preferential forms of affirmative action, derives from a misunder-
standing of the nature and sources of intergroup bias, from a failure to
recognize its tendency to persist over time, and from over-reliance on
limited adjudicatory and regulatory approaches to address what is fun-
damentally a complex cultural problem. Accordingly, I argue that unless
we develop a broadened understanding of intergroup bias and new
approaches to reducing it, the problems of discrimination and inequality
of opportunity will worsen in a post-affirmative action environment.
In this Article's Conclusion, I seek to construct a general concep-
tual foundation for the future development of this broadened view. Its
central premise is simple: discrimination does not solely derive from
stable, dispositional traits internal to actors we call "discriminators."
Rather, intergroup bias increases or decreases in response to contextual,
environmental factors which shape how social actors perceive, judge,
and make decisions about members of their own and other social refer-
ence groups. Accordingly, an anti-discrimination policy grounded in an
individualized search for discriminatory intent cannot be expected to
succeed either in identifying and preventing intergroup bias or in man-
aging social tendencies toward intergroup conflict. If we are to solve the
problem of intergroup discrimination, we must attend more closely to
the ecology of intergroup relations. Eliminating affirmative action
before we have developed an effective alternative theoretical and
doctrinal approach to managing intergroup bias is a strategy more risky
than many might assume.
I
PREFERENCES AND SOCIAL PERCEPTION
Instrumental arguments against affirmative action are based at least
in part on the essentially empirical claim that ultimately, preferences
1258 [Vol. 86:1251
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do more harm than good. Such arguments divide into three broad cate-
gories: arguments about stigma, arguments about the perpetuation of
negative stereotypes and other subtle forms of bias, and arguments
about the negative effects of gender or race-based classifications on
intergroup relations more generally. While most policy-oriented social
cognition literature supports affirmative action, one finds in both the
theoretical models of intergroup behavior and the limited empirical
evidence that exists, reasonable grounds for concern that at least in
some circumstances preferences may have detrimental effects on inter-
group relations.
A. Preferences and Social Cognition:
The Problems of Stigma and Self-Derogation
Among affirmative action critics, one finds widespread adherence
to the idea that using racial or gender preferences stigmatizes benefici-
aries and ultimately undermines their self-confidence and self-esteem.
12
In at least one version of this argument, critics maintain that giving a
preference to members of a particular social group necessarily compro-
mises the principle of merit-based decision making. To the extent that
non-merit criteria are used, selected members of preferred groups will be
unsure about the reasons for their success. This uncertainty creates a
sense of self-doubt and self-derogation in affirmative action beneficiar-
ies. 3
Although various high-profile affirmative action beneficiaries have
compellingly and passionately advanced this claim, 14 research findings
supporting it are complex, contradictory, and difficult to interpret.
Complicating matters further is the unfortunate fact that most research
on the self-derogating effects of affirmative action has focused on gen-
der preference. Little empirical work has been done on the effects of
preferential selection on minority self-evaluation.
The evidence that does exist suggests that, at least under certain
conditions, preferential selection may negatively affect women's self-
evaluations, commitment, and task selection. Thus in a series of studies,
Madeline Heilman and her colleagues demonstrated that women led to
12. See, e.g., Midge Decter, Benign Victimization, 13 POLICY REVIEW 65 (1980); Jeff Howard
& Ray Hammond, Rumors ofInferiority: The Hidden Obstacles to Black Success, NEw REPUBLIC 17
(Sept. 1985); Leonard Reed, What's Wrong with Affirmative Action, WASH. MONTHLY 24 (Jan.
1981); Thomas Sowell, The Plight of Black Students in America, 103 DAEDALUS 179 (1974).
13. The classic statement of this argument can be found in SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF
OUR CHARACTER (1990). Steele writes, "The effects of preferential treatment-the lowering of
normal standards to increase bfack representation-puts blacks at war with an expanded realm of
debilitating doubt, so that the doubt itself becomes an unrecognized preoccupation that undermines
their ability to perform." Id. at 117.
14. See, e.g., STEPHEN L CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991);
STEELE, supra note 13. See also sources cited supra, note 12.
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believe that they had been selected for a particular position because of
their gender subsequently evaluated their skills in the relevant domain
more harshly,15 showed less interest in persisting in the position,6 chose
less challenging tasks,17 and evaluated other female but not male appli-
cants more negatively than did female subjects who believed they had
been selected using merit-based criteria.
18
Other researchers have observed similar effects. For example, a
1989 study asked male and female subjects to evaluate their own per-
formance on a creativity task. Researchers told one set of subjects that
"affirmative action" had been used to insure that enough members of
their gender would be included in the study. Researchers told other sub-
jects that they had been included because they had received a high score
on a previously-administered creativity test. Although there were no
significant effects on measured creativity, subjects in the "affirmative
action" condition evaluated their performance significantly less favora-
bly than did subjects in the "merit" condition. 9
In an earlier study, William Austin and his colleagues assessed the
reactions of male and female beneficiaries in a simulated affirmative
action selection procedure. 20 In the "affirmative action" condition,
subjects were told that because an insufficient number of members of the
subjects' gender group had previously been selected to receive a desired
benefit, they would now be selected to receive it. In a second condition,
subjects were told that their receipt of the benefit was based on per-
formance.
In Austin's original study, subjects of both genders selected in the
"affirmative action" condition evaluated their selection as unfair and
reported moderate levels of emotional discomfort and distress. Inter-
estingly, however, subsequent attempts at replication found white males
apparently immune to the effect. In these studies, only women and
15. See Madeline E. Heilman et al., Intentionally Favored, Unintentionally Harmed? Impact of
Sex-Based Preferential Selection on Self-Perceptions and Self-Evaluations, 72 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
62 (1987). See also Marlene E. Turner et al., Sex Differences in Reactions to Preferential
Selection: Towards a Model of Preferential Selection as Help, 6 J. Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 797
(1991) (replicating Heilman's results).
16. See Heilman et al., supra note 15.
17. See Madeline E. Heilman et al., Skirting the Competence Issue: Effects of Sex-Based
Preferential Selection on Task Choices of Women and Men, 76 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 99 (1991).
18. See Madeline E. Heilman, Jonathan A. Lucas, & Stella R. Kaplow, When Similarity Is a
Liability: The Effects of Sex-Based Preferential Selection on Reactions to Like-Sex and Different-Sex
Others, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 917 (1991).
19. See Rupert W. Nacoste, Affirmative Action and Self-Evaluation, in AFFIRMATIvE ACTION
IN PERSPECTIVE 103 (Fletcher A. Blanchard & Faye J. Crosby, eds., 1989).




members of ethnic groups operating under a "suspicion of inferiority21
reported feeling stigmatized by preferential selection.2
One can certainly find support in these studies for the argument
that preferences injure beneficiaries by creating, or by reinforcing, an
internal sense of stigma and self-doubt. But the picture is not so simple.
Subsequent studies have demonstrated that the self-denigrating effects of
affirmative action are highly sensitive to contextual variables and,
under certain conditions, disappear entirely. To appreciate the com-
plexity of the empirical findings on this issue, it is useful to divide the
research into two broad areas: the effects of preferences on self-
evaluations of aptitude and achievement; and the effects of preferences
on motivation, commitment, and task selection.
1. Self-Evaluations of Aptitude and Achievement
Subsequent research has significantly qualified early research results
indicating that preferential selection leads to a self-denigrating evalua-
tion effect. For example, where beneficiaries receive positive, unambi-
guous performance feedback, the self-denigrating effect disappears-at
least as to those aspects of performance on which feedback was
received.2 But this feedback generalizes neither to other aspects of per-
formance, nor to broader self-conceptions of ability.24
To complicate matters further, some studies indicate that the
effects of preferential selection on self-evaluation vary according to the
precise nature of the selection procedure. Thus, in studies using gender
alone to make selections, there is a relatively strong negative self-
evaluation effectY But the effect seems to disappear when subjects are
21. See Brenda Major et al., Attributional Ambiguity of Affirmative Action, 15 BASIC & APPLIED
Soc. PSYCHOL. 113, 118 (1994).
22. See Heilman et al., supra note 15, at 67 (reporting that women's, but not men's, self-
perceptions and self-evaluations were negatively affected by a sex-based preferential selection
method relative to a merit-based selection method); Madeline. E. Heilman et al., Self-Derogating
Consequences of Sex-Based Preferential Selection: The Moderating Role of Initial Self-confidence,
46 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & Hum. DECISION PROCESSES 202 (1990) (reporting that when
provided with no positive or negative information about performance on a test for leadership, female
subjects selected preferentially reported lower self-evaluations than females selected under a merit
condition; no such differences in self-evaluation were reported observed in male subjects across the
preferential and merit selection conditions); Monica E. Schneider et al., Social Stigma and the
Potential Costs of Assumptive Help, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. J. 201, 207 (1996) (reporting
that black subjects receiving unrequested help from a white peer had lower competence-based self
esteem and more depressed affect than white subjects who received unrequested help; no
differences in self-esteem or affect were found between blacks and whites who did not receive
help).
23. See Turner et al., supra note 15, at 810.
24. See id. For further discussion of these findings, see Marlene E. Turner & Anthony R.
Pratkanis, Affirmative Action as Help: A Review of Recipient Reactions to Preferential Selection and
Affirmative Action, 15 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 43, 47 (1994).
25. See sources cited supra note 15.
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told that qualifications, as well as group membership, have been used in
making selections.26 Compounding the observed complexity, other in-
vestigators find that selection procedure has no effect on patterns of
self-evaluation in affirmative action beneficiaries, 27 or find that sub-
jects' personal views about the fairness of affirmative action determine
whether they experience a self-denigrating effect of preferential selec-
tion.21 In short, evidence on this question is mixed and the findings dif-
ficult to interpret.
2. The Effect of Preferences on Motivation, Commitment, and Task Se-
lection.
Subsequent research has similarly qualified empirical findings indi-
cating that preferential selection negatively affects beneficiaries' moti-
vation, commitment, and task selection. For example, individual
qualifications along with group membership criteria lessened the nega-
tive effect of preferential affirmative action on women's interest in
affiliating themselves with a particular employer.29 Similarly, female
subjects' interest in entering an occupation in which gender preferences
are used in hiring varies with the proportional representation of women
in that occupation. 0 In another study, while women selected on sex
alone chose less demanding performance tasks, women selected on the
basis of both sex and qualifications demonstrated no such effect. 3'
Finally, while one study found an affirmative action program
corresponded with lower levels of job excitement among black males, it
found precisely the opposite effect for black females. 3 Thus, studies
differ in their findings on the effects of preference on beneficiary moti-
vation, commitment, and task selection,33 with results depending largely
on contextual variables.
34
26. See Heilman et al., supra note 15; Major et al., supra note 21; Rupert W. Nacoste, Selection
Procedure and Responses to Affirmative Action, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 225 (1985).
27. See Turner et al., supra note 15.
28. See Nacoste, supra note 19, at 108.
29. See Nacoste, supra note 26.
30. See Madeline E. Heilman & Joyce Mardenfeld Herlihy, Affirmative Action, Negative
Reaction? Some Moderating Conditions, 33 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERF. 204, 208
(1984).
31. See Heilman et. al., supra note 17.
32. See Marylee C. Taylor, Impact of Affirmative Action on Beneficiary Groups: Evidence
from the 1990 General Social Survey, 15 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 143 (1994).
33. See Heilman et. al., supra note 15; Heilman et. al., Self-Derogating Consequences, supra
note 22; Heilman et. al., Skirting the Competence Issue, supra note 17.
34. See Turner et al., supra note 15; Marlene E. Turner & Anthony R. Pratkanis, Effects of
Preferential and Meritorious Selection on Performance: An Examination of Intuitive and Self-
Handicapping Perspectives, 19 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 47 (1993) (including
variables such as sex-based selection and task motivation).
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In short, empirical investigations of the self-derogating effects of
affirmative action so passionately described in the popular literature
paint no clear picture and suggest no clear policy direction. On the one
hand, some studies indicate a reasonable basis for concern. On the other
hand, subsequent findings suggest that beneficiaries' responses will vary
considerably depending on who the beneficiaries are, how they feel
about affirmative action, and how specific policies are described and
implemented. Research findings so complex and contradictory provide a
poor foundation for public policy making, and from the standpoint of
advocates on either side of the debate, can probably best be described as
unhelpful.
B. Preferences and Social Perception: Evaluation, Attribution,
and the Perpetuation of Negative Stereotypes
Affirmative action opponents frequently argue that using racial or
gender preferences reinforces negative stereotypes about minorities and
women. The argument generally proceeds as follows: nonbeneficiaries
who suspect that preferences played a part in decision making will
assume that merit-based criteria alone would not have selected preferred
group members. Because preference permits people to attribute pre-
ferred group members' success to factors other than merit, affirmative
action reinforces stereotypic assumptions of outgroup inferiority and
thus hampers stereotype change.
In evaluating the utility of affirmative action preferences as a tool
for lessening intergroup strife, it would be valuable to know whether
preferences do reinforce negative stereotypes. Whether we think the
use of preferences should reinforce negative stereotypes of women and
minorities, it is important to know whether they do.
Research findings on this question are somewhat more straightfor-
ward and provide a more substantial basis for concern than those relat-
ing to affirmative action's potential self-derogating effects. Indeed, the
weight of empirical evidence reasonably supports the view that using
preferences tends to exacerbate subtle forms of intergroup bias in the
evaluation of affirmative action beneficiaries. Theoretical interpreta-
tions also provide substantial basis for concern: much of what we know
about stereotypes' tendency to resist the corrective influence of discon-
firming evidence reinforces concerns about the negative effects of
affirmative action on intergroup perception and judgment.
To understand these empirical findings and explanatory models,
and to appreciate their siguificance for the affirmative action debate, it
is useful to consider research on the effects of preferences in three
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broad areas: the evaluation of beneficiary qualifications, causal attribu-
tion,35 and stereotyping and stereotype change.
1. Preferential Selection and the Evaluation of Affirmative Action
Beneficiaries
A substantial body of research considers whether preferences nega-
tively affect other people's evaluations of affirmative action benefici-
aries. In one group of studies, experimenters asked subjects to evaluate
the qualifications of people supposedly selected for employment or for
admission to programs of higher education. Researchers indirectly
informed subjects in one condition that the selecting institution had an
affirmative action program. In a second condition, researchers made no
mention of affirmative action. Subjects in the "affirmative action"
condition consistently rated the files of selected women and minorities
as reflecting lower levels of competence, qualification, and accom-
plishment than did subjects evaluating identical files in the "non-
affirmative action" condition.36
In a related study, subjects paired five resumes with five people
supposedly recently hired by a particular employer. When told that
affirmative action had been used in recent hiring decisions, subjects
paired the one African American in the employee group with the weak-
est resume at a rate significantly higher than did subjects in a second
condition, where affirmative action was not mentioned.37 In yet another
study, subjects led to believe that affirmative action efforts had been
involved in the influx of women into a particular occupation tended to
assume that the women entering the field were unqualified. Researchers
did not observe this denigrating effect in a control condition, with the
same facts but no mention of affirmative action." In all of these stud-
ies, the perception that employers used preferences in making
35. The terms "causal attribution," "attributional ambiguity," and "attribution bias" may require
definition. Every day, people encounter events that require explanation. Cognitive psychologists refer
to this explanatory process, which occurs without intention and with little awareness, as "causal
attribution." See, e.g., SUSAN T. FisKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COorITION 57-95 (1991). In
many situations, events can be attributed to any of a number of different causes. This condition is
termed "attributional ambiguity." Causal attribution is subject to a variety of systematic biases and
distortions. These are referred to, collectively, as "attribution bias." Id. at 66-86.
36. See Luis T. Garcia et al., The Effect of Affirmative Action on Attributions About Minority
Group Members, 49 J. OF PERSONALITY 427 (1981); Madeline E. Heilman et al., Presumed
Incompetent? Stigmatization and Affirmative Action Efforts, 77 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 536 (1992);
Rupert W. Nacoste, Policy Schemas for Affirmative Action, in APPLICATIONS OF HEURISTICS AND
BIASES TO SOCIAL ISSUES 205 (Linda Heath et al. eds., 1994).
37. See Gregory B. Northeraft & Joanne Martin, Double Jeopardy: Resistance to Affirmative
Action from Potential Beneficiaries, in SEx ROLE STEREOTYPING AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
POLICY 81 (Barbara A. Gutek ed., 1982).
38. See Heilman & Herlihy, supra note 30.
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selections negatively affected subjects' evaluations of beneficiaries'
qualifications.
Another broad class of experiments investigated the effect of pref-
erential selection on the evaluation of female co-workers. In one
experiment, Jacobson and Koch paired male subjects with a female con-
federate, who was designated as the "leader" on a collaborative task.39
Researchers told some subjects that they chose the female "leader" by
chance. They told other subjects that she was selected because of her
superior performance on a previously administered test of leadership
ability. They told another group of subjects that the "leader" had been
selected because of her sex. After subjects performed the task with the
female "leader," researchers told them either that they had succeeded or
that they had failed. In the "sex-based selection" condition, subjects
blamed the female confederate for failure, but did not give her credit for
their success, at a rate significantly higher than that observed in either
the "chance" or "merit-based" selection conditions.40
Taken as a whole, this research suggests that in many contexts,41
members of majority groups will assume that individual women and
minorities selected in connection with preferential forms of affirmative
action are less qualified and less capable than others. Some social scien-
tists simply interpret this effect as a form of racism. Others explain it
in somewhat less inflammatory and, I would suggest, ultimately more
constructive terms, drawing on theories of causal attribution, stereo-
typing, and processes of stereotype change.
2. Affirmative Action Preferences and the Perpetuation of Negative
Stereotypes: The Role of Attributional Ambiguity
As I described in earlier work, biases in the attribution of causation
frequently result in discrimination against members of stereotyped out-
groups.42 Assume for example that two individuals, one a member of a
stereotyped outgroup and the other a member of a dominant ingroup,
experience the same negative outcome. If a member of the outgroup
39. See Marsha Jacobson & Walter Koch, Women as Leaders: Performance Evaluation as a
Function of Method of Leader Selection, 20 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PER. 149 (1977).
40. See id. These findings were later replicated and extended by Madeline Heilman and her
colleagues. See Madeline E. Heilman et al., The Other Side of Affirmative Action: Reactions of
Nonbeneficiaries to Sex-Based Preferential Selection, 81 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 346 (1996).
41. The denigrating effect of perceived preferential selection, like its self-denigrating effects,
appears to be context-sensitive, at least in some respects. So, for example, it has been shown to
intensify where performance feedback is ambiguous, and to lessen where selection decisions are
based both on group status and qualifications. See e.g., Madeline E. Heilman et al., The Affirmative
Action Stigma of Incompetence: Effects of Performance Information Ambiguity, 40 ACAD. OF MGmT.
J. 603 (1997).
42. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995).
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experiences the negative outcome, and if it is consistent with a stereo-
type associated with that group, ingroup members will tend to attribute
the bad outcome to stereotype-consistent traits, such as lack of ability.
If, on the other hand, a member of a preferred ingroup experiences the
negative outcome, it will more likely be attributed to transient external
factors, such as bad luck or task difficulty.
43
Favorable outcomes are attributed in a similar pattern. If a positive
outcome contradicts a negative group stereotype, success by the stereo-
typed outgroup member is apt to be attributed to transient or external
factors. "Expected success" by a dominant group member is more likely
to be attributed to dispositional factors, like skill or hard work.44
Echoing the concerns of social commentators like Shelby Steele,
social cognition theorist Brenda Major and her colleagues suggest that
affirmative action preferences exacerbate attribution biases of this
type.45 Preferences create attributional ambiguity. For groups operating
under a suspicion of inferiority, the presence of a preference provides a
plausible reason for success in obtaining employment or admissions to
prestigious educational programs. This plausible explanation, combined
with preexisting negative expectancies relating to ability or achieve-
ment, lessens the likelihood that others will attribute beneficiaries' suc-
cess to merit.
It is important to note that this negative effect depends not only
on the presence of a preference, but also on the existence of negative
stereotypes associated with the preferred group. This may explain the
asymmetry between male and female subjects' reactions to receiving a
sex-based preference. 46 As described earlier,47 various researchers have
found that women who believed that they had been selected because of
their sex rated their competence relatively lower than did women who
believed they had been selected based on merit. However, male subjects
who were told that they had been selected because of their sex rated
their own competence no differently than did male subjects who were
43. See, e.g., Galen V. Bodenhausen & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Effects of Stereotypes on Decision-
making and Information-Processing Strategies, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 267 (1985);
Thomas F. Pettigrew, The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport's Cognitive Analysis of
Prejudice, 5 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 461 (1979).
44. See, e.g., Kay Deaux, Sex: A Perspective on the Attribution Process, in I NE w DIRECTIONS
IN ATrRIBUTION RESEARCH 335 (John H. Harvey et a]. eds., 1976); Madeline E. Heilman & Richard
A. Guzzo, The Perceived Cause of Work Success as a Mediator of Sex Discrimination in
Organizations, 21 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERF. 346 (1978).
45. See, e.g., Brenda Major et al., Attributional Ambiguity of Affirmative Action, 15 BASIC &
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 113 (1994); Brenda Major & Jennifer Crocker, Social Stigma: The
Consequences of Attributional Ambiguity, in AFFECT, COGNITION, AND STEREOTYPING 345 (Diane
M. Mackie & David L. Hamilton eds., 1993).
46. See sources cited supra notes 21, 22.
47. See text accompanying notes 15-19.
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told that their selection was merit based.48 From these results, one can
reasonably conclude that preferential selection potentiates pre-existing
stereotypes associated with members of target groups, it does not create
those stereotypes in the first instance.
Be that as it may, there are serious bases for concern that preferen-
tial forms of affirmative action might reinforce subtle negative expec-
tancies relating to members of beneficiary groups. For example, using
overt preferences in selection decision making can increase the salience
of race or gender in those institutions. As many social cognition
researchers have demonstrated, the more salient a particular character-
istic in the mind of an observer, the more likely that observer will use it
in making causal attributions.49 Thus, we can expect that people will
make race-or gender-relevant attributions more frequently in situations
where race or gender is salient. Given that attributions are much more
common following negative events than following positive events, 0 the
increased salience of gender or racial characteristics occasioned by their
overt use in decision making will increase the number of negative attri-
butions to gender or race. This in turn will reinforce negative gender or
racial stereotypes.5
Examination of this problem from a broader theoretical perspec-
tive only amplifies concern that preferential forms of affirmative
action may reinforce negative gender and racial stereotypes, thus ham-
pering the process of stereotype change. A fairly extensive body of
theoretical and empirical work explores the mechanisms by which
stereotypes persist in the face of disconfirming information. Three
primary mechanisms have been identified: selective memory effects,
expectancy-confirming attribution biases,52 and a process known as
"subtyping."53
48. See, Heilman et al., supra note 18; Heilman et al., supra note 15. Similar results have been
observed with respect to the effect of gender-based selection on task preferences. When they
believed they had been selected because of their gender, women, but not men, tended to avoid
participation in more demanding tasks. See Heilman et al., supra note 17.
49. See generally Leslie Zebrowitz McArthur, What Grabs You? The Role of Attention in
Impression Formation and Causal Attribution, in 1 SOCIAL COGNITION 201-06 (E. Tory Higgins et al.
eds., 1981); Shelley E. Taylor & Susan T. Fiske, Salience, Attention, and Attribution: Top of the Head
Phenomena, in 11 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 249, 264-65 (Leonard
Berkowitz ed., 1978).
50. See generally David L. Hamilton & Robert K. Gifford, Illusory Correlation in Interpersonal
Perception: A Cognitive Basis of Stereotypic Judgments, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 392
(1976).
51. See Faye Crosby & Susan Clayton, Affirmative Action and the Issue of Expectancies 46 J.
Soc. Issuas 61, 68 (1990).
52. As described supra note 35, causal attribution is subject to a number of systematic cognitive
biases. One of these, the expectancy confirmation effect, preserves stereotypes and other implicit
theories from the corrosive effects of potentially disconfirming information. As described in more
detail below, see infra Section II.A.2.a., by attributing stereotype relevant events to one as opposed to
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With respect to selective memory effects, people readily recognize
stereotype-consistent data as relevant. Once recognized, stereotype-
consistent information tends to be encoded into and stored in memory
in a form that makes it readily available for making stereotype-relevant
social judgments.14 This selective memory mechanism, explored later in
this Article, provides a powerful critique of the "colorblindness"
approach to nondiscrimination, but it is not particularly relevant to our
present inquiry.
More relevant is a second phenomenon, known as the expectancy-
confirming attribution bias.5 During the early 1980s, Jennifer Crocker
and her colleagues conducted a series of experiments attempting to
explain an apparent contradiction between two robust research findings.
One body of research had convincingly demonstrated that stereotypes
and other forms of initial expectancies are highly resistant to subse-
quent expectancy-inconsistent information . 6 Another set of findings
indicated that even though this incongruent information did not seem
to alter impressions, it was particularly likely to be recalled.5 7 Why,
Crocker asked, would expectancy-inconsistent information be recalled
at a relatively high rate and yet not alter the prior inconsistent expec-
tancy?
Crocker and her collaborators explained this apparent contradic-
tion by demonstrating that people tend to recall stereotype-
another cause, social perceivers may insulate their prior theories, including stereotypic expectancies,
from the events' theory-disconfurming implications.
53. A category, including a social category such as "black," "woman," or "Hispanic," will
become increasingly differentiated as a perceiver gains more familiarity with its constituents. Over
time, categories develop a reverse tree-like structure, with the "superordinate" category (i.e.
woman) at the top of the tree, and a proliferation of subordinate categories or "subtypes" branching
out beneath it in a hierarchical organization. For a discussion of the nature and function of subtypes
and their relationship to processes of categorization more generally, see, e.g., Patricia W. Linville et
al., Stereotyping and Perceived Distributions of Social Characteristics: An Application to Ingroup-
Outgroup Perception, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 165, 166 (John F. Dovidio &
Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986) (defining "subtype"); see also Eleanor Rosch, Principles of
Categorization, in COGNITION AND CATEGORIZATION 27, 30-35 (Eleanor Roseh & Barbara B. Lloyd
eds., 1978) (describing the vertical organization of superordinate and subordinate categories).
54. See generally Nancy Cantor & Walter Mischel, Prototypicality and Personality: Effects on
Free Recall and Personality Impressions, 13 J. REs. IN PERSONALITY 187 (1979); Myron Rothbart,
Memory Processes and Social Beliefs, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING AND
INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 145 (David L. Hamilton ed., 1978); Myron Rothbart et al., Recall for
Confirming Events: Memory Processes and the Maintenance of Social Stereotypes, 15 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 343 (1979).
55. See Jennifer Crocker et al., Person Memory and Causal Attributions, 44 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 55 (1983).
56. See Crosby & Clayton, supra note 51.
57. See, e.g., Reid Hastie, Memory for Behavioral Information That Confirms or Contradicts a
Personality Impression, in PERSON MEMORY 155, 174-75 (Reid Hastie et al. eds., 1980); Reid Hastic
& Purohit Anand Kumar, Person Memory: Personality Traits as Organizing Principles in Memory for
Behaviors, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 25, 26 (1979).
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inconsistent information about a target individual at a higher than ex-
pected rate only when they have attributed that information to
external, situational factors, rather than to internal dispositional factors
relevant to the stereotype's accuracy. It is the increased attention and
processing accorded inconsistent information during this causal attribu-
tion process that results in the observed high rate of recall. But the
increased attention and processing also results in an attribution of the
expectancy-inconsistent information that insulates the expectancy
from the information's apparently disconfirming effect.8 The informa-
tion is, in a sense, "explained away," leaving the original expectancy
undisturbed.
The implications of this model for the affirmative action debate
are evident. Absent some explanatory theory, the presence of women
or minorities in prestigious educational programs, nontraditional
employment settings, or positions otherwise indicating high levels of
ability and accomplishment would disconfirm a variety of inconsistent,
negative racial or gender stereotypes. Over time, as such instances pro-
liferated, they would be expected to erode the stereotypes they discon-
firmed. 9 Preferential selection, however, provides a plausible situational
attribution for the stereotype-inconsistent information. Once female or
minority presence in "high places" is attributed to preferential selection
rather than to merit-related factors, pre-existing negative stereotypes
are insulated from the potentially disconfirming effect of the otherwise
stereotype-disconfirming data.
Subtyping, a third mechanism involved in stereotype maintenance,
presents one final reason for concern. The effect of stereotype-
inconsistent evidence appears to depend on the frequency and distribu-
tion of its occurrence. 0 Specifically, if disconfirming information is
concentrated in a single individual or in a small or otherwise discrete
group, such individuals are "subtyped" and disassociated from the larger
category with which they are otherwise associated. Severing the subtype
thus preserves the schematic expectancies associated with the
superordinate category as a whole.
The emergence of the stereotype "affirmative action black," fre-
quently discussed in the aversive racism literature,61 indicates that this
58. See Crocker et al., supra note 55, at 63-64. See also Reid Hastie, Causes & Effects of Causal
Attribution, 46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 44, 53-55 (1984).
59. For a thorough elaboration of this model of stereotype change, see Marilynn B. Brewer &
Roderick M. Kramer, The Psychology of Intergroup Attitudes and Behavior, 36 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL.
219,221 (1985).
60. See id.
61. See, e.g., John F. Dovidio et al., Resistance to Affirmative Action: The Implications of




subtyping process has occurred with respect to racial categorization and
stereotyping. Once subtyped as "affirmative action beneficiaries,"
women or minorities in "unexpected" places lose their power to alter
the negative schematic expectancies related to their social group.
In sum, attributional models of observers' and beneficiaries'
responses to affirmative action raise concerns that preferential selec-
tion may indeed perpetuate negative stereotypes. However, these
attributional models also suggest a methodological critique of the
empirical evidence supporting this view.
As discussed earlier, numerous studies have shown that when mem-
bers of stigmatized groups are selected to receive some valued outcome
based on their group membership, they are more likely to respond nega-
tively, devalue their own performance and the performance of others in
their group, and devalue the domain itself, than are members of stigma-
tized groups selected on the basis of personal merit. But as Brenda
Major and her colleagues have demonstrated, these effects weaken sub-
stantially when both group membership and personal qualifications play
a role in selection decision making.
62
One might reasonably argue that this defect in experimental design
substantially circumscribes the applicability of empirical research on
negative reactions to affirmative action. Affirmative action plans, be
they private or government-instituted, voluntary or court-ordered, can
never legally use group membership as the only factor in making selec-
tion decisions.63 Group membership may be used only as one factor in
choosing between otherwise qualified applicants. Given that the policies
simulated in the affirmative action experiments would be unlawful in
any context, one could argue that these studies have little utility in
evaluating existing affirmative action policies.
On the other hand, one could argue that whether group status is
used only in conjunction with other factors, what actually matters is the
perception that selections are based on strong group preferences at the
expense of merit-related factors. Thus, the discourse surrounding
affirmative action will have more effect on public reactions to such
policies than will the actual details of the programs themselves. To
understand the precise effect that the discourse surrounding affirmative
action might have on intergroup relations, one needs to know some-
thing about the psychology of procedural justice.
62. See Major et al., supra note 21, at 133.
63. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 622, 648-56 (1987) (Title VII);
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987); Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978) (Equal Protection Clause).
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C. Preferences and Procedural Justice"
People's reactions to distributive choices are influenced not only
by resulting patterns of distribution, but also by the perceived fairness of
the procedures used in making them.64 The fairer the policy, the more
positive the evaluations.
65
Drawing on these principles, various researchers have suggested
that people react not only to the distribution of outcomes occasioned
by affirmative action policies, but also to the procedures through which
those policies are implemented. According to this perspective, using an
affirmative action preference does not in and of itself stigmatize bene-
ficiaries. Rather, selection using a procedure perceived as unfair imposes
stigma and leads to other negative effects described in the relevant lit-
erature.
66
Research conducted under this model explores the particular condi-
tions under which people are more or less likely to respond either posi-
tively or negatively to affirmative action policies. Taken as a whole,
this research suggests that people react more favorably to affirmative
action distributions where both merit and group membership factor into
distribution decision making; 67 where beneficiaries are described as quali-
fied under applicable merit-based criteria;68 where an historical pattern
of discrimination against the preferred group is made salient in the
description of the procedure; 69 where rigid numerical quotas are
avoided;70 and where preferences are applied in the distribution of
training or educational opportunities rather than in post-training hiring
64. See generally R ALLAN LIND & ToM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); JOHN W. THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
(1975).
65. See generally Tom R. Tyler, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990). See also E. Allan Lind
et al., Procedure and Outcome Effects on Reactions to Adjudicated Resolution of Conflicts of Interest,
39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 643 (1980).
66. See generally Rupert Barnes Nacoste, Sources of Stigma: Analyzing the Psychology of
Affirmative Action, 12 LAW & POL'Y 175 (1990); Rupert W. Nacoste & Darrin Lehman, Procedural
Stigma, 17 REPRESENTATIVE RES. Soc. PSYCHOL. 25 (1987). See also Tom R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCImTY 53-54 (1997).
67. See Nacoste, supra note 26. The more weight given to group membership, the less fair the
procedure is perceived to be. Decreasing assessments of fairness are, in turn, associated with
increasingly negative reactions to the procedure and its beneficiaries. See Jerald Greenberg,
Reactions to Procedural Injustice in Payment Distributions: Do the Means Justify the Ends?, 72 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 55 (1987); E. Allan. Lind et al., supra note 65.
68. See Nacoste & Lehman, supra note 66; Rupert W. Nacoste, But Do They Care About
Fairness? The Dynamics of Preferential Treatment and Minority Interest, 8 BASIC & APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 177 (1987).
69. See Nacoste & Lehman, supra note 66. See also Susan D. Clayton & Sandra S. Tangri, The
Justice of Affirmative Action, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PERSPECTIVE 177 (Fletcher A. Blanchard
& Faye J. Crosby eds., 1989).
70. See James R. Kluegel & Eliot Smith, Affirmative Action Attitudes: Effects of Self-Interest,
Racial Affect and Stratification Beliefs on Whites' Views, 61 SOCIAL FORCES 797 (1983).
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or promotion.71 In short, the manner in which an affirmative action
program is framed and implemented influences subjective perceptions of
procedural justice. Such perceptions, in large measure, determine atti-
tudes towards the program and its beneficiaries.
But if these perceptions drive resistance to affirmative action, and
if the various factors described above are indeed influencing such per-
ceptions, how can one account for the rejection of affirmative action
reflected in Proposition 209? To survive constitutional or statutory
scrutiny, all affirmative action programs must possess the very charac-
teristics identified in those studies as engendering support for affirma-
tive action. Under applicable Supreme Court case law, group
membership can be used only as one factor among many in selecting
between otherwise qualified applicants. 72 Employers cannot consider
group membership at all absent a showing of manifest imbalances in tra-
ditionally segregated job categories. State actors must further show that
other methods of correcting those disparities have failed.73 The use of
preferences must be time limited, and must not "unnecessarily trammel
the interests of non-preferred group members."74 Strict quotas and con-
sideration of group membership in making layoff decisions are explic-
itly prohibited.75
There are at least three possible explanations for the opposition to
affirmative action expressed in the vote on Proposition 209. One plau-
sible explanation draws on Meir Dan-Cohen's concept of "acoustic
separation. ' 76 Dan-Cohen observes that a distinction can aptly be drawn
between two types of legal rules. The first, decision rules, consist of
those legal principles which guide judges in making legal decisions in
specific cases. The second, which Dan-Cohen refers to as conduct rules,
consists of corresponding normative principles which the public under-
stands as binding rules of conduct.
Although these two categories of rules interrelate in a variety of
significant ways, they are not coextensive. Decision rules are communi-
cated to the general public, and are thereby absorbed into corresponding
71. See Stanley H. Jones & Stuart W. Cook, The Influence of Attitude on Judgments of the
Effectiveness of Alternative Social Policies, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 767 (1975);
Francine Tougas & France Veilleux, Who Likes Affirmative Action: Attitudinal Processes Among
Men and Women, in AFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PERSPECTIVE 111 (Fletcher A. Blanchard & Faye
Crosby eds., 1989).
72. See authorities cited, supra note 63.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987).
74. Id. at 183.
75. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305, 319-20 (discussing quotas); Vygant v. Jackson Board of
Education, 476 U.S. 267, 283-84 (1986) (discussing layoff decisions).
76. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HRv. L. REv. 625 (1984).
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conduct rules, through a process of selective transmission.77 As a result,
the two sets of rules may differ. Thus in certain respects, conduct rules,
what people think the law is, may differ from decision rules, the actual
legal principles which judges apply in adjudicating cases.
As Dan-Cohen's model suggests, the voting public may well be
unaware of the procedural prerequisites and restrictions imposed on
affirmative action programs by constitutional and statutory decision
rules. If true, the presence of restrictive provisions would simply not
affect people's subjective assessments of the fairness of affirmative
action.
It is also possible that the particular procedures associated with the
use of group membership in the distribution of valued outcomes have
less real world impact on attitudes towards affirmative action than
theory and research on procedural justice predicts. Or, because the
weighting given to group membership as compared to "merit-related"
criteria is interpreted as either substantive or procedural in nature, pro-
cedural justice models of resistance to affirmative action may actually
confound equity-based and procedure-based determinants of opposition
or support.
Two more cynical explanations may lie at the root of this phe-
nomenon. First, people may know that the law prohibits the "strong"
use of group membership but believe that decision makers simply break
the law and use preferences in legally impermissible ways." Or, it may
be that affirmative action opponents have so successfully dominated
the discourse on the subject that people reflexively associate affirma-
tive action with the use of strong group preferences in selection deci-
sion making.
Finally, as other theorists suggest, it may simply be that resistance
to affirmative action programs is neither equity-based nor fairness-
based, but is rather an expression of "aversive racism. '79 In any event,
whether explained by reference to equity-oriented theories underlying
attributional models, or by models centering on the psychology of
77. See id. at 635.
78. For a careful articulation of this view, supported by numerous specific examples, see
STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE 386-461 (1997).
79. See, e.g., Dovidio et al., supra note 61. The concept of "aversive racism," developed by
Samuel Gaertner and John Dovidio, refers to a particular type of ambivalence stemming from a
conflict between egalitarian values on the one hand and unacknowledged negative beliefs and
feelings towards blacks on the other. "Aversive racists," according to Gaertner and Dovidio, are
highly motivated to preserve a non-prejudiced self image. Thus, in interracial contexts they will avoid
acting in ways that directly reflect racial animus. However, the negative component of their racial
feelings and beliefs expresses in indirect and subtle ways, where a negative response towards blacks
in general, or towards a particular black individual, can be rationalized on some basis other than
race. See generally Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in
PREJUDICE, DISCRBUNATION, AND RACISM 61 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986).
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procedural justice, the results of numerous empirical studies present
substantial ground for concern that preferential forms of affirmative
action are associated with substantial, identifiable costs.
D. Preferences and Social Identity
Affirmative action opponents argue that one cannot use race, gen-
der, or ethnicity as decision-relevant criteria in the allocation of scarce
resources and at the same time build a society in which racial, gender, or
ethnic categories become increasingly irrelevant in determining patterns
of social perception, judgment, and behavior. As discussed above, theory
and research in social cognition suggest that the use of group member-
ship in selection decisions may indeed influence intergroup perception
on an individual level. Research guided by social identity theory suggests
that the use of group preferences may have effects on patterns of inter-
group responding more broadly conceived.
A substantial body of work on intergroup behavior, representing
over thirty years of empirical research, demonstrates that once divided
into groups, even on a trivial or random basis, people exhibit powerful
intergroup biases.80 The mere introduction of "groupness" into a situa-
tion causes people to favor ingroup members in the allocation of
rewards,81 in the evaluation of performance, 2 in memory for positive
versus negative behaviors,83 and in the attribution of success or failure.
8 4
Increasing the salience of group distinctions exacerbates these effects,
while decreasing group salience tends to erode them. 5
The implications of this work for the debate over affirmative
action are conflicting. On the one hand, both social identity theory and
social identity research provide some evidence for the proposition that
the preferential use of gender, race, or ethnicity in allocating competi-
tive outcomes aggravates intergroup discrimination. For example,
placing groups into competition has been shown to increase intergroup
80. For a lucid and thorough review of this literature, see Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Bias in
the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive-Motivational Analysis, 86 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 307
(1989).
81. See Henri Tajfel et al., Social Categorization and Intergroup Behavior, I EuR. J. Soc.
PSYCHOL. 149 (1971).
82. See C. K. Ferguson & H. H. Kelly, Significant Factors in Over-evaluation of Ovn Group's
Products, 69 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 223 (1964).
83. See John W. Howard & Myron Rothbart, Social Categorization and Memory for In-Group
and Out-Group Behavior, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PsYcHoL. 301, 303-06 (1980).
84. See David A. Wilder, Perceiving Persons as a Group: Categorization and Intergroup
Relations, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 213, 217
(David L. Hamilton ed., 1981).
85. See generally Samuel L. Gaertner et al., Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Benefits of
Recategorization, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 239 (1989).
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bias in the allocation of benefits 6 and in the evaluation of outgroup per-
formance.17 Compounding this cause for concern, other research indi-
cates that an episode of personal failure, experienced under conditions
in which group membership has been made salient, exacerbates negative
reactions to members of the contextually relevant outgroup.55 As long
as categorical boundaries remain salient, providing people with individu-
ating information about members of outgroups has little effect on the
tendency to treat outgroup members as an undifferentiated mass.89
Sharply defined category boundaries tend to suppress outgroup differen-
tiation.90
Taken as a whole, research in social identity suggests that reducing
the salience of intergroup boundaries can reduce intergroup bias, while
increasing category salience can exacerbate it. It would be difficult to
argue that the explicit use of race, gender, or ethnicity in allocating
economic resources does not increase the salience of these categorical
distinctions. Thus, if one accepts the claim supported by social identity
research that increased salience worsens tendencies toward intergroup
bias, it becomes difficult to discount the argument that affirmative
action preferences may ultimately aggravate intergroup tensions.
On the other hand, social identity theory suggests that in certain
other respects, affirmative action can produce conditions under which
intergroup relations will improve. Factors other than competition
increase the salience of racial, gender, or ethnic category boundaries.
Particularly, categories will be more salient if they are characterized by
convergent category boundaries and less salient if they are characterized
by cross-cutting category boundaries.91 Category boundaries can be said
to be "cross-cutting" when alternative sources of status, identity, or
other sources of interconnection cross-cut rather than correspond to
category membership. For example, racial mixing in schools,
universities, neighborhoods, or interdependent cooperative workgroups
results in a greater likelihood that members of different racial groups
will occupy ingroups constructed along social dimensions other than
86. See Marilynn B. Brewer & Roderick M. Kramer, The Psychology of Intergroup Attitudes
and Behavior, 36 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 219, 227 (1985).
87. See Bernard M. Bass & George Dunteman, Biases in the Evaluation of One's Own Group,
Its Allies and Opponents, 7 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 16 (1963); W. Doise et al., An Experimental
Investigation into the Formation of Intergroup Representations, 2 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 203 (1972).
88. See James R. Meindl & Melvin J. Lerner, Exacerbation of Extreme Responses to an Out-
Group, 47 . PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 71 (1984).
89. See Norman Miller & Marilyrn B. Brewer, Categorization Effects on Ingroup and Outgroup
Perception, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACIsM 209, 227-28 (John. F. Dovidio & Samuel L.
Gaertner eds., 1986).
90. See id. at 228.
91. See, e.g., Marilynn B. Brewer & Norman Miller, Beyond the Contact
Hypothesis: Theoretical Perspectives on Desegregation, in GROUPS IN CONTACT 281, 283 (Norman
Miller and Marilynn B. Brewer eds., 1984).
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race. These structures provide opportunities for recategorizing members
of otherwise distinct social groups. This multiplication of potential
categorical structures renders each less significant and thus less influen-
tial in intergroup perception, judgment, and behavior.92
Additionally, the presence of relatively equal numbers of members
of different gender, racial, or ethnic categories within a social situation
renders category distinctions less salient, whereas the presence of a clear
minority makes category membership more salient.93 Moreover, placing
members of different social categories into situations involving coop-
erative interdependence and individuating social interactions also
appears to reduce categorical responding. 9
4
Preferential forms of affirmative action result in the relatively
rapid integration of those institutions which use them. The value of this
rapid integration, especially in educational or other settings where
opportunities for individuating interaction between members of differ-
ent groups are plentiful and a newly created sense of group identity is
strong, can hardly be underestimated. Although placing members of dif-
ferent social groups into situations involving cooperative, individuating
contact and the creation of cross-cutting sources of social identity may
not always succeed in eliminating intergroup bias, it is unquestionably
necessary to that end. In sum, the overt use of group membership in
selection decision making may have certain costs, but the disadvantages
associated with segregation are most certainly worse.
Taken as a whole, social cognition, procedural justice, and social
identity theory can be used either to oppose or support preferential
forms of affirmative action. But even if it were possible to determine
whether the costs of preferences outweighed their benefits, such an
exercise would hardly be worthwhile if it could be shown that, absent
affirmative action, remaining policy tools were inadequate. To that
issue our attention now turns.
II
AFTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
RECOGNIZING DISCRIMINATION IN THE LAND OF THE COLORBLIND
What might we expect if every institution in the nation-every
college and university, every corporation, every state and local public
agency, and every arm and organ of the federal government-suddenly
prohibited its employees from considering the race, sex, or national ori-
gin of applicants or employees in hiring, contracting, promotion, or
admission to educational programs? What would happen if every
92. See id.; Gaertner et al., supra note 85, at 246.
93. See Brewer & Miller, supra note 91, at 290.
94. See id. at 290.
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employment and admissions decision maker was told simply to "be col-
orblind," to base his or her decisions only on "considerations of merit"?
Would they do it? Could they do it? Could we identify those who did not
do it, whose decisions were tainted by intergroup bias?
The answers to these questions are, quite simply, "no," ''no," and
"no." Perhaps constitutions can be colorblind. Perhaps official govern-
ment or corporate policies can be colorblind. But human beings living in
a society in which history, ideology, law, and patterns of
social, economic, and political distribution have made race, sex, and
ethnicity salient, cannot be colorblind. The "colorblindness" approach
to nondiscrimination will prove ineffective because it provides neither a
framework for enabling people to recognize the effects of race, gender,
or national origin on their perceptions and judgments, nor the tools
required to help them counteract those effects. Indeed, a color
blindness-centered interpretation of the nondiscrimination principle,
coupled with well-meaning people's awareness that they do categorize
along racial and ethnic lines, may exacerbate the very intergroup anxi-
ety and ambivalence that lead to what social psychologists refer to as
aversive racism.
Furthermore, decision makers cannot base selection decisions only
on colorblind considerations of merit for the simple reason that merit
has a color. Conceptions of merit are socially and politically con-
structed and are shaped by the same ingroup preferences that give rise
to other subtle forms of intergroup bias. Affirmative action preferences
have, in many ways, diverted our attention from the biases inherent in
the construction of merit. But if preferences are eliminated, this prob-
lem and the inequities it generates will soon rise into sharp relief.
Finally, there is substantial reason to doubt that remaining law
enforcement tools, particularly the adjudication of individual disparate
treatment cases, will prove effective in identifying and remedying subtle
but pervasive forms of intergroup bias. For a variety of reasons, reliance
on individual disparate treatment adjudication can be expected to result
in the serious underidentification of discrimination by judicial decision
makers, victims, and private fact finders.
A. The Inefficacy of Colorblindness as a Normative Construct
As I have attempted to demonstrate in earlier work,9 existing
antidiscrimination law constructs intergroup bias as something that
95. In earlier work, I develop in extensive detail the claim that a substantial set of biased
employment decisions derive not from discriminatory motive or intent, but from a variety of cognitive
distortions that systematically bias intergroup perception and judgment even among the well-
intentioned. See Krieger, supra note 42, at 1182-1211. Using more recent research, I intend to build
upon rather than reiterate here the perspective taken in that earlier investigation.
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occurs when a "discriminatory purpose" motivates a decision. In other
words, in order for a decision to be considered "discriminatory" under a
statute such as Title VII, the disparate treatment plaintiff must show
that the employer chose to take the negative action against him
because of his membership in a particular protected class. Thus, to say
that discrimination is intentional means that the decision stands in a
particular sort of close relation to the target person's group status. Spe-
cifically, in the decision maker's mental process, there must be some
syllogistic connection between the two.
So, for example, existing antidiscrimination law understands cogni-
tive stereotypes as causing discrimination through the operation of a
conscious, syllogistic reasoning process, through which the decision




Women with young children are preoc-
cupied with family responsibilities and
do not put their jobs first;
This applicant is a woman with young
children;
This applicant cannot be expected to
put the job first.
Current antidiscrimination law further conceives gender role expecta-
tions, or normative stereotypes, as causing discrimination through the





Women with young children should be
preoccupied with family responsibilities
and should not hold jobs that will com-
pete with the responsibilities associated
with raising children;
The rigors of this job can be expected to
conflict with family responsibilities
associated with raising young children;
This applicant is a mother with young
children;
This applicant should not hold this job.
According to the existing jurisprudential model of discrimination, per-
sonal animosity may also lead to discrimination through the operation
of implicit syllogistic reasoning:
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Major Premise: Working with black coworkers makes
me feel uncomfortable;
Minor Premise: This applicant is black;
Conclusion: Working with him would make me feel
uncomfortable.
In each of these contexts, the decision maker's thinking moves
directly through the target person's group status. So long as we under-
stand discrimination as operating in this way, we can rely on a color-
blindness model of nondiscrimination to function as an effective nor-
mative principle. A social decision maker can refrain from discriminat-
ing simply by refraining from any syllogistic use of the target person's
group status, in other words, by being "colorblind."
But as I have also attempted to demonstrate, 96 not all discrimina-
tion is of this sort. Much discrimination has little connection with dis-
criminatory motive or intent. This sort of discrimination occurs when
an individual's group status subtly, even unconsciously, affects a deci-
sion makers' subjective perception of relevant traits, on which ostensi-
bly non-discriminatory decision are subsequently based. This form of
discrimination results from a variety of categorization-related cognitive
biases, and can result in disparate treatment based on race, sex, national
origin, or other factors, even among the well-intentioned.
I do not wish to rehash the evidence supporting this proposition
described at length elsewhere. Rather, using related but more recent
research, I wish to demonstrate that only "color-consciousness" can
control these cognitive forms of intergroup bias.97 This research
strongly suggests that cognitive biases in social judgment operate auto-
matically, without intention or awareness, and can be controlled only
through subsequent, deliberate "mental correction" that takes group
status squarely into account.98
1. Automatic Processes in Intergroup Judgment
In his early work on perceptual readiness, 9 Jerome Bruner observed
that when a person receives information with the goal of forming an
impression, his or her first cognitive task is to fit that information into
some existing knowledge structure. As Bruner described, only when
96. See Krieger, supra note 42, at 1186-1201.
97. By "color consciousness," I mean the awareness that a person's race or other group status
may be influencing one's perceptions or social judgments about that person.
98. By "mental correction," I mean a conscious, deliberate attempt to correct for the biasing
effect of group status on social perception and judgment.




behavioral information is encoded in this way does it becomes useful, or
even meaningful. 10
Of course, in many situations incoming information is ambiguous
in that it is susceptible to varied interpretations. A student's volun-
teered but halting response to a question can be interpreted as reflecting
dull-wittedness-or courageous engagement with a difficult subject. An
employee's hesitancy in the face of an important decision may evince
timidity-or prudence. As Bruner suggested, "All perception is
generic,"10 1 meaning that observed actions, like objects, take on mean-
ing only when they are assigned to a particular trait construct-a pre-
existing knowledge structure residing in the observer's mind.
In their attempts to understand this process more fully, cognitive
psychologists originally assumed that assigning an action to a particular
trait construct depended primarily on the extent of the "match"
between the features of the action and those of the construct. Then in
the late 1970s through the early 1980s, encouraged no doubt by Amos
Tversky and Daniel Kabneman's seminal work on the availability heu-
ristic, 102 various researchers began investigating the role of trait con-
struct accessibility in social perception. Their work showed that the
readiness with which a person will characterize a particular behavior in
terms of any given trait construct is a function of that construct's
availability in memory at the time the behavior is perceived. 103 Any
activity, conscious or unconscious, that "primes" a particular trait con-
struct will tend to increase its accessibility and the corresponding likeli-
hood that ambiguous information will be assimilated or encoded in a
manner consistent with that trait.'°4
100. See id. at 127.
101. Id. at 124.
102. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency
and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 207 (1973).
103. See, e.g., E. Tory Higgins & Gillian King, Accessibility of Social Constructs: Information-
Processing Consequences of Individual and Contextual Variability, in PERSONALITY, COGNITION,
AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 69, 69-121 (Nancy Cantor & John F. Kihilstrom eds., 1981); E. Tory
Higgins et al., Category Accessibility and Impression Formation, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL.
141 (1977); Thomas K. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Category Accessibility: Some Theoretical and
Empirical Issues Concerning the Processing of Social Stimulus Information, in 1 SOCIAL
COGNITION: THE ONTARIO SYmp'OsIuM 161-97 (E. Tory Higgins et al. eds., 1981); Robert S. Wyer,
Jr. & Thomas K. Stull, The Processing of Social Stimulus Information: A Conceptual Integration, in
PERSON MEMORY 227, 227-300 (Reid Hastie et al. eds., 1980).
104. See, e.g., John A. Bargh & Paula Pietromonaco, Automatic Information Processing and
Social Perception: The Influence of Trait Information Presented Outside of Conscious Awareness on
Impression Formation, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 437 (1982) (showing same effect
following use of unconscious primes); John A. Bargh et al., The Additive Nature of Chronic and
Temporary Sources of Construct Accessibility, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 869 (1986);
Charles S. Carver et al., Modeling: An Analysis in Terms of Category Accessibility, 19 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 403 (1983); Thomas K. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Category
Accessibility and Social Perception: Some Implications for the Study of Person Memory and
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Social stereotypes bias perception in this general manner. As
numerous researchers have demonstrated, one learns at an early age
stereotypes of the major social groups in the United States.15 These
stereotypes have a long history of activation, and are likely to be
highly accessible, regardless of whether they are believed.106 They are
invoked automatically when people encounter members of a stereo-
typed outgroup. Once activated, stereotypes serve to "prime" the trait
constructs with which they are associated. Incoming behavioral infor-
mation, especially if capable of various interpretations, is accordingly
assimilated into those traits associated with the stereotype.10 7
This tendency to assimilate ambiguous information into stereo-
typic trait constructs might not be so serious if people were aware that
they were doing it. To understand the significance of this process and its
implications for the debate over affirmative action, it is useful to under-
stand a phenomenon which attribution theorists refer to as spontaneous
trait inference.
People are highly concerned with understanding why things happen
in their social environments. Rightly or wrongly, we assume that under-
standing why something has happened will improve our power to pre-
dict or even control what will happen in the future. 08 To the extent
that personality traits play an important role in understanding people's
actions, one might expect the process of translating observed behaviors
into trait-related meanings to occur with great frequency. Given that
Interpersonal Judgments, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 841 (1980) (demonstrating influence
on interpretation of ambiguous behavior using conscious primes); Thomas K. Srull and Robert S.
Wyer, Jr., The Role of Category Accessibility in the Interpretation of Information About
Persons: Some Determinants and Implications, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1660 (1979).
105. See generally Patricia G. Devine, Automatic and Controlled Processes in Prejudice: The
Role of Stereotypes and Personal Beliefs, in ATTITUDE STRUCTURE & FUNCTION 181, 182-84
(Anthony R. Pratkanis et al. eds.,1989). See also Mary Ellen Goodman, RACE AWARENESS IN YOUNG
CHILDREN (rev. ed. 1964); Phyllis A. Katz, The Acquisition of Racial Attitudes in Children, in
TOWARDS THE ELIMINATION OF RACIsM 125 (Phyllis A. Katz ed., 1976). In discussing her finding
that, by the age of four, children have already begun to internalize the stereotypes of major social
groups, Dr. Katz tells a chilling story. While at a grocery store in one town where she was conducting
field research, Dr. Katz observed a three year old white child who, upon seeing an African-
American infant in a stroller remarked, "Look mom, a baby maid!" See id. at 147.
106. See Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled
Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 6-7 (1989); John F. Dovidio et al., Racial
Stereotypes: The Contents of Their Cognitive Representations, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
22 (1986); Samuel L. Gaertner & John P. McLaughlin, Racial Stereotypes: Associations and
Ascriptions of Positive and Negative Characteristics, 46 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 23 (1983). This tendency
to interpret ambiguous behaviors in a manner consistent with ethnic stereotypes appears to develop
quite early. See Krieger, supra note 42, at 1202-03.
107. See Higgins & King, supra note 103, at 72-75.
108. The earliest attribution theorists recognized this impulse. See, e.g., Fritz Heider, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS (1958); Harold H. Kelly, Attribution in Social




social perception and judgment processes become increasingly efficient
with repeated execution, one might further hypothesize that trait infer-
ence processes could become so overlearned as to operate without
intention or awareness, much like the processes involved in recognizing
a word or a face.
This hypothesis appears to be correct. In a number of studies repli-
cated in a variety of contexts by other researchers, New York
University psychologist James S. Uleman and his colleagues demon-
strated that European-American 0 9  subjects spontaneously encode
behaviors into stable trait constructs without intention or awareness." 0
Thus, there is a strong tendency, at least among European Americans,
to attribute stable dispositional qualities spontaneously, as part of the
process of perceiving and encoding information about another person's
behavior. To say that trait inference is "spontaneous" however is not
quite the same as saying it is "automatic,""' and the difference is critical
to equal opportunity policy.
Through the early-1980s, it was generally believed that a particular
mental process was either entirely automatic or entirely deliberate.l1 2
Over time, however, cognitive processes came to be understood as
falling along a continuum. On one side of that continuum lie
"controlled processes," which require substantial processing capacity
and occur with greater levels of focus and awareness. On the other side
lie fully automatic processes, which occur without intention 3 or aware-
ness, are difficult if not impossible to control once triggered, and
109. The tendency spontaneously to infer stable dispositional traits from observed behaviors is, at
least in part, culturally determined. Cross-cultural studies have demonstrated that non-European-
American subjects use fewer dispositional qualities to explain other's behaviors, and are more likely
to locate the cause of behaviors in the situation confronting the actor. For more on these findings, see
generally Joan G. Miller, Culture and the Development of Everyday Social Explanation, 46 1
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 961 (1984); Leonard S. Newman, Why Are Traits Inferred
Spontaneously? A Developmental Approach, 9 Soc. COGNITION 221, 247 (1991); E. Rhee et al.,
Spontaneous Self-Descriptions and Ethnic Identities in Individualistic and Collectivistic Cultures, 69 .
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 142, 142-52 (1995). For a comprehensive overview of research on
spontaneous trait inference, see James S. Uleman et al., People as Flexible Interpreters: Evidence
and Issues From Spontaneous Trait Inference, 28 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 211
(1996).
110. See generally Uleman et al., supra note 109 (reviewing the experimental evidence for and
describing spontaneous trait inference).
111. Truly "automatic" mental processes possess four qualities: they are unintentional, they
occur outside of awareness, they are efficient in their use of attentional resources, and, most
importantly, they are uncontrollable. See generally John A. Bargh, The Four Horsemen of
Automaticity: Awareness, Intention, Efficiency and Control in Social Cognition, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL COGNITION 1, 1-2 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K. Srull eds., 2d ed. 1994).
112. See id. at 2.
113. In the relevant literature, "intention" is defined as whether one is in control of the
instigation of a particular mental process. So for example, the automatic process by which a wooden
structure with four legs, a vertical back, a platform and horizontal side supports is categorized as a
chair can be understood as occurring without intention.
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interfere little with other ongoing mental activity. 114 Eventually, it be-
came apparent that complex mental processes such as causal attribution
and other forms of social inference were neither exclusively automatic
nor exclusively controlled, but rather combined aspects of both.1,5
Specifically, social inference came to be understood as comprising a
chain of three sequential subprocesses: "categorization," in which the
person perceived is identified and placed within an existing categorical
structure; "characterization," in which spontaneous dispositional infer-
ences are drawn from the observed behavior; and "correction," in which
those dispositional inferences are adjusted to account for situational fac-
tors. While categorization and characterization are automatic, correc-
tion is controlled. It requires deliberate, effortful mental processing and
will compete for cognitive resources with other information processing
demands. 1
16
As I have indicated, the recognition that social inference comprises
both automatic and controlled processes bears significant implications
for the colorblindness approach to non-discrimination. When we
encounter a person in our social environment, we automatically place
that person into pre-existing categorical structures.11 7 It is virtually
impossible to escape this proclivity. As Eleanor Rosch observed, the
particular categories into which people will divide their environment are
determined by how well those divisions help them understand that envi-
ronment and predict future events.' Admonitions to refrain from
categorizing the social environment in a particular way will prove inef-
fective if those categories reflect patterns made salient by history, cul-
ture, or observable patterns of economic, demographic, or political
distribution. Whether we like it or not, it is highly implausible to assume
that an American of one race encountering an American of another
race would not notice racial attributes or use those attributes in initially
categorizing the person perceived. It is one thing to maintain as a
114. See Laraine Winter et al., How Automatic Are Social Judgments? 49 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 904, 905 (1985).
115. For an early challenge to the original understanding of automatic and controlled processing,
see George A. Quattrone, Overattribution and Unit Formation: When Behavior Engulfs the Person,
42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 593 (1982). For .a comprehensive discussion of how trait
inference eventually came to be viewed as possessing some but not all characteristics of automatic
processing, see, e.g., Bargh, supra note 111, at 2-3.
116. See Bargh, supra note 111, at 28-30; Daniel T. Gilbert, Thinking Lightly About
Others: Automatic Components of the Social Inference Process, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT 189, 194
(James L. Uleman & John A. Bargh eds., 1989).
117. See Bargh, supra note 111, at 13; Marilynn B. Brewer, A Dual Process Model of Impression
Formation, in 1 ADVANCES IN SOCIAL COGNITION 1, 3-9 (Thomas K. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr.
eds., 1988).
118. See Eleanor Rosch, Human Categorization, in 1 STUDIES IN CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 1,
40 (Neil Warren ed., 1977).
1998] 1283
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
normative matter that people should not categorize by race. But it is
counterfactual to maintain that they will not do so." 9
There is substantial theoretical and empirical support for the view
that the presence of members or symbolic representations of a stereo-
typed group automatically activates stereotypes associated with that
group.20 As an automatic process, stereotype activation is uninten-
tional-a person has no control over its initiation.12' Once activated,
the stereotype functions as a prime, thereby pulling spontaneous trait
inference in a stereotype-consistent direction. As Patricia Devine dem-
onstrated, this automatic process of stereotype activation will occur in
both high and low prejudice individuals. 22
Stereotypes are not the only or even the most insidious source of
inference-biasing primes. In a fairly chilling series of studies, social cog-
nition researchers have shown that merely thinking about one's self or
one's ingroups, or being subliminally exposed to such ingroup primes
such as "us" or "we," results in the automatic activation of generally
more positive trait concepts 23 Thus, it is reasonable to believe that
people will interpret ambiguous behaviors of persons with whom they
identify more positively than they will interpret similar behaviors of
persons from whom they feel socially distant.
The significance of these processes and their implications for the
colorblindness approach to nondiscrimination can hardly be overem-
phasized. Very little information shapes a social perceiver's impression
of a target person. Rather, it is the perceiver's interpretation of the raw
information that influences social judgment. If the target's social group
membership influences these interpretations, and if one is unaware of
the effect of such status on those interpretations, how can we expect a
colorblindness approach to nondiscrimination to function successfully
as a normative principle? Given the realities of social perception, we
can anticipate that similarly situated people will be treated differently
based on their group membership, because decision makers, influenced
by these subtle forms of intergroup bias, will not perceive them as
119. See, e.g., Shelley E. Taylor et al., Categorical and Contextual Bases of Person Memory and
Stereotyping, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 778 (1978) (describing how race is used as an
encoding strategy irrespective of perceiver "intention").
120. See Brewer, supra note 111, at 3-9; Devine, supra note 105; Charles W. Perdue & Michael
B. Gurtinan, Evidence for the Automaticity of Ageism, 26 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 199
(1990); Felicia Pratto & John A. Bargh, Stereotyping Based on Apparently Individuating
Information: Trait and Global Components of Sex Stereotypes Under Attention Overload, 27 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 27 (1991).
121. See Brewer, supra note 111, at 6; Devine, supra note 106, at 6, 89-90.
122. See Devine, supra note 106, at 12, 15.
123. See Charles W. Perdue et al., Us and Them: Social Categorization and the Process of
Intergroup Bias, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 475, 482-83 (1990). See also Jennifer Crocker
& Ian Schwartz, Prejudice and Ingroup Favoritism in a Minimal Intergroup Situation: Effects of Self-
Esteem, 11 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 379 (1985).
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similarly situated at all. Nothing in the colorblindness approach to non-
discrimination provides social decision makers with the tools
required to recognize or to correct for biases of this sort.
According to spontaneous trait inference theory, only the applica-
tion of deliberate, controlled, corrective processes can prevent stereo-
types and subtle ingroup priming valences from biasing interpersonal
judgment. As social cognition researchers Patricia Devine and Susan
Fiske observe, it is neither that nonprejudiced individuals "do not
notice" such traits as gender or ethnicity nor that the presence of a
member of another group does not "prime" the stereotypes associated
with those groups. Rather, insofar as cognitive sources of bias are con-
cerned, the difference between people who discriminate and those who
do not is that members of the latter group notice the influences of
stereotypes on their thinking and counteract those influences by con-
sciously adjusting responses in a nonprejudiced direction. This process,
however, is effortful: it requires both strong motivation and a great deal
of capacity, attention, and practice. 24 In short, controlling the biases
stemming from such processes as spontaneous trait inference is substan-
tially more complicated than it might at first seem.
2. Controlled Processes and Nondiscrimination: Taming the Beast of
Automaticity
The major sources of error in human judgment divide into two
broad types. Errors of the first type stem from a failure to know or
apply normative rules of inference. Errors of the second type result
from a phenomenon which Timothy Wilson and Nancy Brekke refer to
as "mental contamination."' Mental contamination occurs when a
person's judgment or behavior is corrupted by unconscious or uncon-
trollable mental processes which she would rather not have influence her
behavior or decisions.'26 Judgment errors deriving from rule ignorance or
incorrect rule application are easier to remedy than those resulting from
mental contamination. Normative rules of inference, like the rule of
regression to the mean, 27 supply specific procedures for solving the
124. See Devine, supra note 105, at 188.
125. See Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental
Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 117,
117 (1994).
126. See id.
127. Regression to the mean is a statistical phenomenon in which unusually high or low values in
a distribution tend to be followed by more average values. So, for example, parents who are
particularly tall tend to have children who are closer to average height; extremely high test scores
tend to be followed by scores closer to the mean; and extremely high jury verdicts tend to be followed
by lower ones that more closely approximate the average award for cases of that type. The tendency
to overlook regression to the mean, often referred to as nonregressive prediction, leads to systematic
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problems to which they pertain and can be consciously learned and
deliberately applied.
128
Correcting judgmental errors resulting from mental contamination
is more difficult, in large part because simply teaching people a particu-
lar decision rule is unlikely to control biases of which they are unaware.
This will be particularly true if the biases in question are difficult to rec-
ognize, or easily mistaken for valid, decision-relevant considerations. A
supervisor evaluating employees for promotion, or a professor consid-
ering which student to hire as a research assistant, may know the rule,
"don't discriminate against the black guy." But that kind of rule, in this
case the colorblindness rule, cannot be applied in the same way as cost-
benefit analysis or the rule of regression to the mean. It can be applied
to eliminate facial discrimination-that is, a conscious, explicit policy
of excluding a certain group of persons from consideration. It might
even be applied to eliminate the conscious, deliberate use of group
status as a proxy for decision-relevant traits like initiative or writing
ability. But it cannot be applied to prevent or correct biases caused by
emotional discomfort, the subconscious effects of stereotypes, causal
attribution, or spontaneous trait inference, because it fails to provide a
specific set of procedures or techniques which can be applied to the
evaluation or decision task at hand. A normative decision rule, such as
one prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, cannot be applied to
eliminate a source of bias if the decision maker is unaware that her
judgment might be biased or is unable to control the effects of such bias
for lack of applicable remedial tools.
As Wilson and Brekke explain, four discrete conditions must be
satisfied if people are to control the effects of nonconscious biases.
First, one must become aware of the nature of the particular mental
process which threatens to bias one's judgment. Sec6nd, one must be
motivated to correct its unwanted influence once it has been recognized.
Third, one must be able to discern the direction and magnitude of the
bias, lest it be "overcorrected" and judgment skewed in the opposite
direction. And finally, one must have sufficient control over his or her
mental processes to correct the effect of the unwanted influences.'29
errors in judgment. See SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING
116-118 (1993).
128. It is well-established that people are able to learn these rules, apply them in appropriate
contexts, and thereby reduce the incidence of judgment error in those situations to which they pertain.
See, e.g., Geoffrey T. Fong et al., The Effects of Statistical Training on Thinking About Everyday
Problems, 18 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 253 (1986); Geoffrey T. Fong & Richard E. Nisbett, Immediate
and Delayed Transfer of Training Effects in Statistical Reasoning, 120 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: GENERAL 34 (1991); Richard P. Larrick et al., Teaching the Use of Cost-Benefit
Reasoning in Everyday Life, 1 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 362 (1990); R. E. Nisbett et al., Teaching
Reasoning, 238 SCIENCE 625 (1987).
129. See Wilson & Brekke, supra note 125, at 119-20.
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While it is beyond the scope of this Article to review all of the
problems encountered at each of these four stages, those with the most
serious implications for the colorblindness model of nondiscrimination
warrant attention here.
a. Unawareness of Mental Process
During the fall of 1996, while the campaign on Proposition 209
swirled around the University, I was teaching a class on employment
discrimination law. Every day, I called on a different student to respond
to questions about the cases prepared for that day's class. Most of my
students were Caucasian; only three of sixty-five were African
American. Let us assume for purposes of illustration, that one day I had
called on one of these three African-American students, and that he
experienced a certain amount of difficulty answering various questions.
He was not unprepared, but many of his answers were halting and some-
what confused, leaving me with the initial impression that he was not
particularly capable.
I flatly reject the belief that African-American law students are less
intelligent than others. If asked at the beginning of the semester to
predict how any one of my three African-American students would
perform relative to their classmates, I would have vigorously objected
to making a prediction in the absence of individuating information.
Given that I am familiar with certain normative rules of inference such
as the principle of regression to the mean, I would probably, if pushed,
have predicted that his or her performance would be about average.
But it is also true that, although I reject them as untrue, I am aware
of the stereotypes associated with intelligence, academic achievement,
and African-American males. I too was exposed to those stereotypes at
a very early age, before I developed my own powers of critical and
moral intelligence and made a conscious decision to reject these stereo-
types as inaccurate and unfair. But my nonprejudiced beliefs did not dis-
place the stereotypes, which exist alongside and function independently
of these beliefs. The stereotypes are triggered whether I believe in them
or not.30 And, once triggered, those stereotypes prime the trait con-
structs associated with them, constructs like "not too bright" or
"underachieving," rather than "grappling courageously with a difficult
subject."
So, what should one conclude if I had taken from this hypothetical
encounter the initial impression that the student in question was "not
particularly capable?" His performance had not been very good. Why
130. For further elaboration of the nature and empirical evidence supporting this "dual process
model," see, e.g., Devine, supra note 105, at 186-88, and sources cited therein.
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then, should I even question whether the student's race had anything to
do with my judgment?
If such a situation were to arise, I would likely question my initial
impression only if: (1) I was aware of the possibility that negative
stereotypes of African-American males, or some other aspects of the
situation had subtly influenced my judgment; and (2) 1 was motivated to
do something about it.
Of course, other subtle cognitive sources of bias besides racial
stereotypes could have "contaminated" my judgment as well. If I
approached the issue mindfully, I would probably have noticed that over
the course of the semester, a number of students I had called on had per-
formed relatively poorly, some just as poorly as the student in question.
But try as I might, if I had not made contemporaneous notes, I probably
could not now remember just who those students were. I would remem-
ber the African-American student, but I would most likely have forgot-
ten the others.
This scenario illustrates a common unconscious source of bias-the
polarized evaluation of distinctive members of an otherwise largely
homogeneous group."' It is well-established that people pay particularly
close attention to distinctive stimulus objects, such as a "token" woman
or minority group member. And the more attention we pay to some-
thing, the more about it we perceive, encode, and store in memory.
Indeed, under conditions of high attention, we are more likely to encode
an event visually, which makes it more readily available in memory and
more influential in the formation of subsequent judgments. Accordingly,
the poor performance of a distinctive minority student is more likely to
be remembered, and will tend to be charged with a more powerful nega-
tive valence, than the poor performance of a majority white student.
If I were unschooled in these sorts of salience or expectancy-
related biases, I would likely remain unaware that the student's race had
played any role in the formation of my initial impression that he was
"not particularly capable." But could I fairly deny that he had been
negatively judged, at least in part, because of his race?
The colorblindness approach to nondiscrimination is dangerous
because it leads a decision maker to believe that, so long as she is not
consciously thinking about race, she is not discriminating. But social
cognition theory teaches that, in a culture pervaded by racial
stereotypes, or where persons of one race constitute a small minority in
an otherwise homogeneous group, one must think about race in order
not to discriminate. In short, the colorblindness principle discourages
the first step prerequisite to controlling cognitive sources of intergroup
bias.
131. For a more thorough discussion of this phenomenon, see Krieger, supra note 42, at 1193-95.
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b. The Role of Motivation
All "dual process 13' models of social inference posit that in order
to correct errors caused by an automatic mental process, people must
not only be aware of the process, but must also be motivated to control
its biasing effects. Of course, the development of awareness itself
requires motivation. Despite early controversy on particular issues,133 it
is now relatively well-accepted that people lack awareness of a large
proportion of mental processing,3 4 including the processes comprising
impression formation. 35
Developing self-awareness of such processes and correcting for the
various biases inherent in them is in any context objectively difficult.
Even after they are activated, the controlled processes required for
mental correction require a great deal of capacity and attention and will
compete for cognitive resources with other mental demands. But in the
context of intergroup discrimination, the order is taller still. Increasing
awareness of and sustained attention to the biasing effects of racial,
ethnic, or gender stereotypes on one's social judgments is apt to engen-
der fear of moral opprobrium and substantial psychological discomfort.
Thus, especially in the context of reducing intergroup bias, there is little
reason to assume that people will expend the effort or bear the psy-
chological discomfort associated with mental correction unless they
have strong motivations for so doing. Thus, the colorblindness
approach not only fails to provide incentives for developing an aware-
ness of mental contamination, but the model itself and the rhetoric that
often accompanies it actually establish disincentives for so doing.
Affirmative action opponents, including racial minorities who have
benefited from those preferences, frequently argue that it is time for
minorities to stop blaming their problems on discrimination.'36 There
are undoubtedly disadvantages associated with "victim mentalities," and
there is ample reason to air those disadvantages in a broad-ranging
132. I borrow this term from Marilynn B. Brewer, see Brewer, supra note 118, but use it here to
refer as well to James Uleman's model of spontaneous trait inference, Patricia Devine's
disassociation model of stereotyping and prejudice, and Wilson & Brekke's model of mental
contamination and correction. See Devine, supra note 106; Uleman, supra note 109; Wilson &
Brekke, supra note 125.
133. For a discussion of these controversies, see Timothy D. Wilson & Julie I. Stone, Limitations
on Self-Knowledge: More on Telling More Than We Can Know, in SELF, SITUATIONS, & SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR 167 (Philip Shaver ed., 1985).
134. See generally J.F. Kihlstrom, The Cognitive Unconscious, 237 SCIENCE 1445 (1987); PAWEL
LEWICiu, NONCONSCIOUS SOCIAL INFORMATION PROCESSING (1986); JAMEs S. ULEMAN & JOHN A.
BARGH, UNINTENDED THOUGHT (1989).
135. See Gilbert, supra note 116, at 190. See generally Ellen J. Langer, Rethinking the Role of
Thought in Social Interaction, in 2 NEw DncnONs IN ATTRIBUTION RESEARCH 35 (John H. Harvey
et al. eds., 1978); LEwicKI, supra note 134.
136. See, e.g., STEELE, supra note 13, at 118-19; Thomas Sowell, Black Progress Can't Be
Legislated, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1984, at B1.
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policy debate. But one must remember that the statement that "it is
time for minorities to stop blaming their problems on discrimination" is
heard not only by members of minority groups, but by members of the
majority as well. To them, it sends the message, "You can stop worry-
ing about discrimination now."
In such a rhetorical environment, people, most of whom are pre-
disposed to overconfidence in their capacity to resist cognitive biases,
are unlikely to expend the effort and endure the discomfort required to
cultivate awareness of the subtle effects of race on their perception and
judgment. If people equate "not thinking about race" with nondiscrimi-
nation, neither their own desire to live true to some inner set of egali-
tarian values, nor their desire to conform to antidiscrimination norms
will help them recognize or control cognitive forms of intergroup bias.
If they do seek to engage in mental correction, adjusting for the effects
of cognitive biases will feel like racial preferencing. In other words, the
very things required to eliminate cognitive forms of bias will be experi-
enced as a violation of the colorblindness norm.
c. The Limits of Mental Correction
As Timothy Wilson and Nancy Brekke observe, even if a person
becomes aware that some unwanted mental process has tainted her
judgment, she may not be able to determine the magnitude of the
resulting bias.'37 For example, in my hypothetical interaction with my
African-American student, I might have become aware that stereotype
or salience-related biases had influenced my assessment of his perform-
ance. But assuming that I were eventually required to formulate an
evaluation, how far, if at all, should I adjust it? There is really no way
for me to assess how much of my impression is fairly attributable to bias
and how much to the student's flawed performance.
Even more troubling is the question whether "correction" is feasi-
ble at all. Once the initial impression that the student was "not particu-
larly capable" had been formed, would I be able to erase it from my
mind, or prevent it from influencing my impressions of him in connec-
tion with future interactions?
There is ample reason to fear that I would not. In a series of now
classic studies, Stanford psychologist Lee Ross and his colleagues dem-
onstrated that, even after a belief is discredited, the causal explanations
generated to support it persist, giving the discredited belief a kind of
cognitive life after death.' More recently, University of Texas
137. See Wilson & Brekke, supra note 125, at 120.
138. See Craig A. Anderson et al., Perseverance of Social Theories: The Role of Explanation in
the Persistence of Discredited Information, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1037 (1980);
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psychologists Daniel Gilbert and Randall Osborne extended these obser-
vations to the process of spontaneous trait inference. 39 Their work
demonstrates that once a trait inference is made, subsequent efforts to
adjust it may prove ineffective. As they observed, misperceptions are
"metastatic.' ' 4° Controlled processing may correct the original misper-
ception, but it often fails to eliminate subsidiary changes that the origi-
nal misperception engendered. These endure and influence subsequent
judgments of the person perceived. It is easier to forbear from action
based on a biased impression than to eliminate the impression itself 
1 41
Assuming I realized that my impression formation process was
potentially biased, I might have decided to reject the view that the stu-
dent was not particularly capable. I might even have decided not to take
action based on my initial impression of his in-class performance, for
example, deciding not to use it in calculating his grade. But I would
probably not be able to erase the impression from my mind. Given its
enduring presence, I would likely experience any adjustments in my sub-
sequent behavior toward or expressed beliefs about the student as a form
of racial preferencing. "After all," I might tell myself, "if the student
weren't African-American, I wouldn't be bending over backwards like
this." What the colorblindness perspective would allow me to forget, or
never teach me in the first place, is that if the student were not
African-American, I probably would not have remembered his perform-
ance at all.
B. Merit
In the debate over affirmative action, preferential selection is fre-
quently contrasted with selection based on merit. Without question, the
problem of merit is central to the debate. Although affirmative action
supporters have attempted to sidestep the issue by comparing affirma-
tive action to veterans' preferences or legacy admissions, it would be
unwise to ignore the challenge presented by the normative principle of
merit-based decision making.
1. The Merit Principle and Perceptions of Procedural Justice
At least in the United States, virtually every psychological model
advanced to explain people's responses to distributive allocations
reflects the centrality of merit in people's perceptions of fairness.
Lee Ross et al., Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception: Biased Attributional
Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 880 (1975).
139. See Daniel T. Gilbert & Randall E. Osborne, Thinking Backward: Some Curable and
Incurable Consequences of Cognitive Busyness, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 940 (1989).




Equity theory, for example, observes that distributive outcomes are
perceived as just to the extent that contributions correspond with re-
wards.142 When individual "inputs" and "outputs" fail to correspond, the
over- and under-rewarded, the directly affected, and the third-party ob-
server respond negatively. 43 And while the equity principle is not the
only justice rule influencing subjective responses to distributive alloca-
tions,'44 it appears to be the one most commonly applied in the work-
place.1
45
Merit-based decision-making principles also figure centrally in the
psychology of procedural justice. Thibaut and Walker's early work on
the subject posits that people view procedures for making distribution
decisions as fair to the extent that they are afforded some measure of
control over the decision process. 46 This control, which Lind and Tyler
refer to as "procedural voice,' 14 7 powerfully influences the perceived
fairness of distributive outcomes, participant satisfaction with out-
comes, and attitudes towards decision makers and their institutions. 48
As previously described, procedural justice researchers have applied
these principles to the problem of affirmative action stigma. 49 In the
affirmative action context, procedural justice models suggest that candi-
dates have some measure of process control over criteria such as past
performance or achievement. Consideration of these criteria gives
voice to the candidate. Accordingly, decision processes which utilize
them can be termed "high voice" procedures. Consideration of criteria
such as gender or race on the other hand, over which the individual can-
didate has no control, function as "low voice" procedures. Their use
erodes perceptions of procedural fairness along the lines originally sug-
gested by Thibaut and Walker and later developed by Tyler and Lind.
As Nacoste has suggested, empirical research revealing a stigma-
tizing effect of affirmative action preferences can also be understood
along these lines.50 Where merit-related, high voice criteria predomi-
nate in decision making, affirmative action programs are perceived as
fair, even if group membership is also considered. However, where group
142. See generally E. WALSTER ET AL., EQUITY (1978).
143. For a review of relevant research, see Tyler et al., supra note 66, at 45-52.
144. See Morton Deutsch, Equity, Equality, & Need: What Determines Which Value Will Be
Used as the Basis for Distributive Justice?, 31 J. Soc. IssuEs 137 (1975).
145. See id. See generally, TYLER ET AL., supra note 66, at 56-65 (describing research and
theoretical models bearing on the choice of allocation decision rules).
146. See John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 81-96 (1975).
147. E ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 9
(1988).
148. See id. at 180, 191-97; see also TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 125-34
(1990).
149. See sources cited, supra notes 66-71.
150. See Rupert Barnes Nacoste, Sources of Stigma: Analyzing the Psychology of Affirmative
Action, 12 LAW & POL'Y 175 (1990).
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membership is seen as dominating other decision criteria, affirmative
action policies are perceived as unfair and are associated with negative
reactions to both beneficiaries and to the institutions employing
them.151
As this research suggests, the problem of merit should be neither
trivialized nor ignored. Some conception of merit is essential for any
public institution faced with the task of distributing scarce and valued
resources. That said, the concept of merit cannot be taken at face
value. Those who champion colorblind systems of selection err by pre-
suming that merit is an objective, race- and gender-neutral construct,
itself unaffected by subtle forms of intergroup bias.
2. Social Identity, Social Cognition, and the Construction of Merit
In reality, merit is neither neutral nor objective. It is defined and
assessed through the same complex, largely unconscious cognitive proc-
esses which subtly bias social judgment in other contexts and give rise to
more easily recognizable forms of discrimination.
I have discussed at some length above how schematic expectancies,
salience effects, and other forms of cognitive bias can unintentionally
influence one's subjective evaluation of members of other social groups.
In earlier work, I have attempted to demonstrate that existing civil
rights laws, in particular those relating to discrimination in employ-
ment, are ill-equipped to reckon with bias of this sort.52 But in the con-
text of educational admissions, the problem is somewhat different. In
education, admissions decisions are often made on the basis of a candi-
date's performance on anonymously scored, objective assessment meas-
ures, such as the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), the Law School
Admissions Test (LSAT), or on grade point averages. Grading in many
educational settings is conducted on a blind basis, where instructors do
not know the identity of the student being evaluated. In these contexts,
many of the social judgment biases previously discussed are inoperative.
But it does not follow that selection systems based on these osten-
sibly objective measures of merit are unaffected by intergroup bias. Such
biases intrude in a variety of ways: in the conceptualization of merit, in
the selection and use of particular tools for measuring merit, and, more
fundamentally, in the very selection of individual merit, however con-
strued and measured, as the applicable allocation decision rule.
Merit-oriented approaches to employment or educational admis-
sions selection call upon decision makers to identify a set of criteria
that are expected to predict success in the relevant enterprise. Deter-
mining whether a particular criterion accurately predicts success in a
151. See id. at 183.
152. See Krieger, supra note 42.
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given endeavor is actually quite a complicated process, governed by a
set of complex statistical procedures known as "validation."'' 3 Although
various forms of validation differ in certain ways, they all entail: (1)
the identification of behaviors constituting success; (2) the identifica-
tion of specific claimed predictors of success; and (3) the calculation of
the extent and statistical significance, if any, of covariation between
these two.
Informal validity judgments, such as whether or to what extent
LSAT scores predict success in lawyering, are subject to a variety of
errors and biases at each of these three points. Consider the first step
described above. In many situations, there is nothing particularly neutral
about the way success is defined. The "intuitive" validity tester 54 can
identify or prioritize in subjectively biased ways the particular behaviors
constituting success in the relevant endeavor. For example, although
success in legal academia ostensibly involves performance in three
domains-teaching, research, and service-it is generally accepted in
many institutions that research is the one that really counts. Rarely are
professors denied tenure for mediocre-or even outright poor-
teaching. Rarely is service to the school or the profession determinative
when tenure decisions are made. Whether plausible justifications exist
for this prioritization is not the point. The point is this: defining suc-
cess is a subjective process subject to subtle forms of intergroup bias
with which existing civil rights law has little capacity to reckon.
Consider a second example. Success in many lawyering jobs, such as
those with federal regulatory agencies, is generally assessed through
evaluation of performance across a variety of domains, including ability
to work with and supervise investigators, the quality of litigation out-
comes, the ability to manage a caseload, and the quality of written
work. However, when hiring or promotion decisions are made, one of
these factors, such as the quality of written work, is often weighted
more heavily than the other three.
In many situations there may be good reason for weighting certain
factors more heavily than others when defining merit. But social iden-
tity theory predicts that intergroup bias will play a role as well.
Social identity research conducted under Tajfel's "minimal group
paradigm"'155 has shown that we undervalue the product of an outgroup
153. For a thorough discussion of statistical validation procedures, and their use in employment
discrimination litigation, see id. at 1231-36.
154. I borrow here a term coined by social psychologist Lee Ross. See Lee Ross, Tile Intuitive
Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process, 10 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173 (1977), reprinted in COGNITIVE THEORIES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 337 (L. Berkowitz ed., 1978).
155. See Tajfel, supra note 81. In the minimal group paradigm, subjects are divided into
categories on the basis of some arbitrary or "minimal" distinction. For example, experimenters tell
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in relation to our own group's products.1Y6 Accordingly, if those who
control the definition of merit in a particular social context belong to
the same social reference group, and if members of that group tend to
excel on one of the relevant performance dimensions in relation to the
others, social identity theory predicts that those who determine merit
will tend to overvalue performance in the domain where they collec-
tively excel. Behavioral domains in which a corresponding outgroup
excels will tend to be undervalued. In this way, the same ingroup biases
that lead to other forms of discrimination influence the definition of
merit.
Other cognitive biases influence the particular attributes identified
to predict success. The most significant of these biases derives from a
phenomenon which Daniel Kalmeman and Amos Tversky refer to as
the "representativeness" heuristic. 1 7 According to Kahneman and
Tversky, a person attempting to determine whether a particular indi-
vidual (e.g., a law school applicant) falls into a particular category or
class (e.g., successful law school graduates) is unlikely to proceed
according to the normative rules of inference governing such decision
tasks. Rather, he is likely to match salient attributes of the stimulus
object (the applicant) with equally salient attributes characterizing his
prototype of the category in question (the successful graduate). If the
two sets of attributes match, the person will be more likely to judge the
target as a member of the class in question. If the degree of match is
low, he will be less likely to reach that conclusion.
This heuristic method of predicting future success injects substan-
tial subjectivity into the assessment of merit. As discussed above, the
mental representation of successful law school graduate held by faculty
members at prestigious law schools is subject to a variety of subtle
biases, including the tendency to overvalue members of one's own
group, and the tasks at which one personally excels. Thus, when primed
with the phrase "successful law school graduate," legal academics at
prestigious universities would be relatively unlikely to form an image of,
say, Johnny Cochran, even though his defense in the O.J. Simpson mur-
der trial arguably constitutes one of the most significant advocacy suc-
cesses in recent criminal litigation history. More ready to mind would be
a partner at a large law firm, a successful legal academic, or an appellate
subjects that they are being placed in different groups based on having over or under-estimated the
size of dots displayed on a screen. After introducing the concept of "groupness," experimenters then
investigate the nature and extent of intergroup bias displayed by subjects, as compared to the
subjects' behavior in an unassigned control condition. For a review of research conducted under this
paradigm, see generally Brewer, supra note 80.
156. See Bass & Dunteman, supra note 87; Doise, supra note 87.
157. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL.
R V. 237 (1973).
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judge. Accordingly, the attributes associated with these prototypes will
be subjectively overvalued in merit assessments. The process of
selecting a prototype against which applicant attributes come to be
matched is profoundly influenced by patterns of intergroup bias, yet this
process is almost entirely invisible in antidiscrimination law.
Good lawyers do a wide variety of things and employ a wide variety
of skills. Lawyers question and listen to clients, witnesses, decision mak-
ers, and opponents. They counsel, comfort, and cajole. They negotiate.
They work collaboratively with clients and others to solve problems in
ways that require practical wisdom as well as legal analytical skill. Law-
yers are public speakers. Lawyers are storytellers. Relatively little of
what many lawyers do involves the kind of legal analysis taught in law
schools. 58 Which law school applicants will become good lawyers is a
question legal educators have barely begun to ask.
Why is it that law schools have made so little attempt to predict
applicants' potential as interviewers, counselors, negotiators, creative
and flexible problem solvers, storytellers, or public speakers? And what
impact does that failure have on the racial, ethnic, or gender distribu-
tion of those applicants deemed most qualified for admission to law
school? The answer to these questions has much to do with subtle forms
of intergroup bias.
Consider the use of LSAT scores in law school admission decision
making. The LSAT predicts, within a certain range of error, perform-
ance in the first year of law school. However, it does not purport to
predict success in lawyering. In the language of employment discrimina-
tion law, it has only limited "training program validity," not "job
validity."' 59 Nonetheless, decision makers use the LSAT extensively in
law school admissions, despite its substantial adverse impact on
African-American and Latino/Chicano applicants, and despite its lim-
ited utility in predicting success in lawyering.
Admittedly, there are good reasons for using LSAT scores in the
law school admissions process. It has more demonstrated predictive
utility, at least with respect to first year performance, than most avail-
able indicators. It is relatively convenient and inexpensive to use. But,
if a selection device with such limited validity so negatively affected
members of the social group controlling law school admissions proce-
dures, would its use continue? Would its continued use be perceived as
fair?
158. For a discussion of the sharp divergence between what law students learn and what lawyers
do, see, e.g., Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin, Lmv Schools and the Constrnction of Competence, 43
J. LEGAL EDUC. 469 (1993).
159. For cases regarding training program validity, see, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229




There is substantial reason to suspect not. As an intriguing study by
S.H. Ng demonstrates, 10 ingroup favoritism alters people's judgments
about the rules of fairness that should be applied in allocating resources
or rewards. After being divided into groups according to Tajfel's mini-
mal group technique, subjects in Ng's study observed the performance of
an ingroup member and an outgroup member while they worked
together on a cooperative task. In one condition, the ingroup member
objectively outperformed the outgroup member; in another condition,
the situation was reversed. After viewing performance outcomes, sub-
jects were asked to allocate a reward between the two performers and
were given a choice of two principles for doing so: an equal allocation
principle and an equity principle in which allocations were based on
relative performance.
When the outgroup member outperformed the ingroup member,
subjects disproportionately applied the equal allocation principle, a
choice justified by the cooperative nature of the task. However, when
the ingroup member outperformed the outgroup member, subjects dis-
proportionately applied the equity principle and allocated a greater
reward to the ingroup member, a result which subjects justified on
grounds of relative merit.161
Ng's study demonstrates that the fairness rules chosen to govern
the allocation of social resources, including those grounded in concep-
tions of merit, are not preordained manifestations of natural law. They
are social, ultimately political decisions, subject to the same forms of
intergroup bias that influence reward allocation in other intergroup con-
texts.
Social identity research on intergroup attribution bias also predicts
that the LSAT would be valued differently in making law school admis-
sions decisions if it disproportionally disadvantaged members of the
social group controlling those admissions. Once people are divided into
social categories, even on a minimal basis, they will tend to attribute
success by ingroup members to stable, dispositional traits and failure by
ingroup members to external, situational factors. The pattern is
reversed with respect to attributions of success and failure by outgroup
members. 62 Given these tendencies, we can expect that relative success
by ingroup members on a particular task would be attributed to disposi-
tional factors, namely those manifesting qualification or merit. We
would further expect that relatively lower levels of success by outgroup
160. See Sik Hung Ng, Equity and Social Categorization Effects on Intergroup Allocation of
Rewards, 23 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 165 (1984). Tajfel's minimal group technique is described supra,
text accompanying notes 80-85.
161. See id. at 170-71.
162. For a review of this literature, see Wilder, supra note 84.
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members would be attributed to dispositional factors, and would be
interpreted as indicating a relative lack of qualification or merit. But if
the situation were reversed, and the outgroup outperformed the ingroup,
intergroup attribution models predict that relative ingroup failure and
relative outgroup success would be disproportionally attributed to exter-
nal factors, such as the unfair use of an invalid or otherwise biased
assessment tool. Here, as elsewhere, subtle forms of intergroup bias
affect the definition of merit and the selection of those principles and
tools by which it will be measured.
3. Intergroup Bias in the Construction of Merit: The Inadequacy of
Existing Law
Preferential forms of affirmative action have largely masked the
subtle forms of intergroup bias inherent in the construction of merit.
Because preferences could be used to equalize results at the bottom line,
the task of identifying such sources of bias and of devising the legal
tools to control them have not loomed as pressing priorities. But in a
post-affirmative action environment, where the application of previ-
ously unquestioned criteria can result in glaring racial and ethnic inequi-
ties, the problem assumes a far sharper sense of urgency.
This raises the obvious question of whether, in a post-affirmative
action environment, remaining legal tools will prove equal to the task
of identifying and eliminating subtle forms of intergroup bias in the
construction and assessment of merit. There is ample reason to fear
not.
Consider in the first instance the utility of equal protection theory
in addressing any of the subtle forms of bias discussed above. Disparate
impact theory, which might be used to challenge the use of unvalidated
selection criteria, is unavailable in cases brought under the Equal
Protection Clause. In such cases, a plaintiff must show that the defen-
dant acted with a discriminatory purpose. 163
With respect to this requirement, it is not sufficient for the plain-
tiff to demonstrate that those who chose to use a particular selection
criterion were aware that it would disadvantage members of a particular
social group. To succeed under an equal protection theory, a plaintiff
must prove that the defendant chose the particular selection criterion
"'because of,"' not merely "'in spite of,"' its negative impact on mem-
bers of the plaintiff class. 64 Thus, so far as the establishment of selec-
tion criteria is concerned, an entire range of discriminatory practices
stemming from subtle forms of intergroup bias is effectively insulated
from constitutional challenge.
163. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
164. See Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
1298 [Vol. 86:1251
CIVIL RIGHTS PERESTROIKA
The situation is little better with respect to potential statutory
claims. The rule enunciated in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney
applies in statutory discrimination cases as well. Accordingly, in a dispa-
rate treatment case commenced under either Title VI (education) or
Title VII (employment) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a plaintiff
must prove purposeful discrimination along the lines Feeney
describes.165
Of course, in employment discrimination cases brought under Title
VII, disparate impact theory is potentially available to address certain
forms of bias in the construction and assessment of merit. Thus for
example, requiring that an objective test which has a disparate impact
on a group protected by Title VII be statistically validated in accordance
with professional standards 66 prevents many forms of intergroup bias
implicated in the ostensibly neutral assessment of merit. Disparate
impact theory is an essential equality tool in this context for the simple
reason that it renders the definition of merit contestable. Without such
a tool, and given the rule enunciated in Feeney, there would be no way
to challenge the many subtle forms of bias operationalized in the osten-
sibly group-neutral assessment of merit.
Largely absent from the debate over affirmative action, at least in
the educational context, has been any serious recognition that existing
legal tools fail to provide a mechanism for contesting unquestioned
definitions of merit. In Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 167 a majority of the Supreme Court held that Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964168 proscribed only those forms of purposeful dis-
crimination prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.1 69 In Guardians
Association v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, 170 a
majority of justices, expressing their views in four separate opinions,
held again that a violation of Title VI required proof of discriminatory
intent.
By contrast, the regulations interpreting Title VI promulgated by
the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights proscribe not
165. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 684 (1987); Forsberg v. Pacific
Northwestern Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1418 (9th Cir. 1988); American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783
F.2d 716, 722 (7th Cir. 1986); American Fed'n of State, City and Mun. Employees v. Washington, 770
F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).
166. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (describing the validation requirement); 29 C.F.R. §1607.1-.7 (1994) (stating that
the use of any selection criterion or procedure which has an adverse impact will be considered
discriminatory unless it has been validated in accordance with the standards set forth in the
Guidelines).
167. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
168. 42U.S.C. § 2000d(1998).
169. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287 (Powell, J.); id. at 328 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall,
and Blackmun, JJ.).
170. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
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only intentional discrimination, but also the use of criteria or methods
of administration that have an unjustified disparate impact on a group
protected by Title VI. 7 Oddly, in Guardians, a majority of then sitting
justices held that even though a plaintiff must prove discriminatory
intent to establish a Title VI violation, proof of unjustified discrimina-
tory effects would provide a basis for limited injunctive and declaratory
relief in actions brought by private parties under the Title VI regula-
tions. 172
Although various lower federal courts have followed Guardians and
permitted Title VI plaintiffs to proceed under a disparate impact theory
in actions to enforce the regulations, 73 no reported case has ever
challenged the use of either the SAT, the LSAT, the Graduate Record
Exam (GRE), or the Medical College Admissions Test (MCAT). Indeed,
171. Specifically, the relevant portion of the regulations provides:
A recipient, in determining the types of services, financial aid, or other benefits, or facilities
which will be provided under any such program, or the class of individuals to whom, or the
situations in which, such services, financial aid, other benefits, or facilities will be provided
under any such program, or the class of individuals to be afforded an opportunity to
participate in any such program, may not, directly or through contractual or other
arrangements, utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of
subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin, or
have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of
the program as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin.
34 C.F.R. §100.3(b)(vii)(2) (1997). Department of Education regulations promulgated under Title IX
are even more explicit in proscribing the use of tests or other admissions criteria which have a
disparate impact based on sex. Pertinent Title IX regulations provide, in relevant part:
A recipient shall not administer or operate any test or other criterion for admission which
has a disproportionately adverse effect on persons on the basis of sex unless the use of such
test or criterion is shown to predict validly success in the education program or activity in
question and alternative tests or criteria which do not have such a disproportionately
adverse effect are shown to be unavailable.
34 C.F.R. §106.21(a)(2) (1997).
172. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 607 n.27. This principle was reaffirmed a year later in Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985). Describing its holding in Guardians, the Alexander Court reflected:
In essence, then, we held that Title VI had delegated to the agencies in this first instance the
complex determination of what sorts of disparate impacts upon minorities constituted
sufficiently significant social problems, and were readily enough remediable, to warrant
altering the practices of the federal grantees that had produced those impacts.
469 U.S. at 293-94.
173. See, e.g., Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 486 (10th Cir. 1996); New York Urban
League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2nd Cir. 1995); Chicago v. Lindley, 66 F.3d 819, 827
(7th Cir. 1995); Elston v. Talledega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (1 1th Cir. 1993); David
K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265, 1274 (7th Cir. 1988); Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030,
1044 (7th Cir. 1987); Latinos Unidos de Chelsea En Accion (LUCHA) v. Secretary of Housing and
Urban Dev., 799 F.2d 774, 795 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. LULAC, 793 F.2d 636, 648 (5th Cir.
1986); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981, as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (9th Cir.
1986); Castaneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d 456, 466 (5th Cir. 1986); Georgia State Conference of
Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1416 (11th Cir. 1985); Young v. Montgomery County
Bd. of Educ., 922 F. Supp. 544 (M.D. Ala. 1996); Ass'n of Mexican-American Educators v.
California, 836 F. Supp. 1534, 1545 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Grimes v. Sobol, 832 F. Supp. 704, 709
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); Groves v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 776 F. Supp. 1518, 1522 (M.D. Ala 1991);
Theresa P. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 724 F. Supp. 698, 716 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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as of the writing of this Article, I have been unable to find a single re-
ported Title VI or Title IX case in which college or graduate school ad-
missions criteria have been challenged. Thus, unlike employers, whose
selection procedures have for years been subject to challenge under Title
VII, institutions of higher education have been left to define and assess
merit in admissions decision making in an atmosphere utterly devoid of
legal contest.
It remains to be seen whether the odd rule of Guardians will sur-
vive changes in the composition of the Court. Only one of the justices,
John Paul Stevens, who held that a disparate impact challenge could be
brought under the Title VI regulations, remains on the Court. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, both of whom rejected such a
rule, also remain. It is difficult to imagine that Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
or Thomas would endorse a rule whereby a civil rights enforcement
agency would be permitted, through its administrative rule-making
power, to impose liability based on an "effects" standard where the
Supreme Court has interpreted the relevant statute as requiring proof of
intent to discriminate. The dearth of activity under Title VI may,
among other things, reflect a lack of confidence in the viability of the
Guardians rule.
One should not overstate the efficacy of disparate impact theory
in the employment context either. As Elizabeth Bartholet has noted,
while courts have shown a willingness to require validation of employee
selection criteria in cases involving low-level jobs, they have been
largely unwilling to require it, or to apply disparate impact theory at all,
in cases involving "jobs in high places."'174
Indeed, even in the employment context, the continued viability
of the validation requirement stands in serious doubt. In Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank and Trust,175 a plurality of the Court rejected the argument
that statistical validation was necessarily required to prove business
necessity, and suggested that the existence of a legitimate business rea-
son might suffice to sustain a challenged selection procedure.
76
Precisely how the courts will interpret the business necessity stan-
dard remains highly uncertain, even after passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.177 Thus, there is no way of knowing whether Title VII will
174. Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L Rav. 947,
947 (1982).
175. 487 U.S. 977, 999 (1988).
176. See id. at 997-99.
177. Largely in response to the Court's decision in the disparate impact case of Ward's Cove
Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). Among other things, the Act restored the burdens of proof in
disparate impact cases as they existed prior to the Court's decision in Ward's Cove. See §§ 2-3,
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994). However, the Act makes no mention of the validation
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continue to provide a business necessity standard stringent enough to
control the subtle forms of intergroup bias operationalized in ostensibly
objective employee selection procedures.
More fundamentally, however the business necessity standard is
construed, disparate impact theory cannot be used to challenge the
manner in which an employer prioritizes performance across different
job-relevant dimensions. Nor, given the intent requirement, are such
subjective valuations amenable to challenge under a disparate treatment
theory. Thus, if an employer chooses to value or to reward most highly
those attributes or aspects of performance on which white males dis-
proportionally excel, there is little in existing antidiscrimination law
that can be mobilized to stop them.
Merit is not a neutral construct, nor is its definition, cultivation, or
identification free of intergroup bias. If, as a society, we design equal
opportunity policy around the concept of merit but fail to recognize
the biases inherent in its construction or application, we will simply
operationalize subtle forms of bias in ways that make discrimination
extremely hard to identify or correct. Our civil rights laws are not pres-
ently equipped to reckon with biases of this sort. In short, basing alloca-
tion decisions on group-neutral conceptions of merit is an august goal,
but like colorblindness, one more elusive than affirmative action oppo-
nents admit.
C. The Limits of Individualized Adjudication
In a 1991 study of federal Title VII litigation, economists John
Donohue and Peter Siegelman observed that over the course of the
1980s, the federal employment discrimination docket changed in a
variety of significant ways.' Specifically, Donohue and Siegelman
showed that while early Title VII cases tended to challenge discrimina-
tion in hiring, by the end of the 1980s most cases alleged discrimination
in discharge. 79 The 1980s also witnessed a dramatic decline in the use of
the class action device in employment discrimination litigation, such
that by the end of the decade the overwhelming majority of Title VII
suits involved individual claims of disparate treatment discrimination
brought by individual private litigants.'80 Claims of disparate impact,
requirement, and leaves unresolved the precise contours of the business justification defense. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (1992).
178. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983 (1991).
179. See id. at 984.
180. See id. at 1019 (describing the decline in the incidence of employment discrimination class
actions and attributing that decline in substantial part to changes in legal rules relating to class
certification standards under Rule 23, as well as standards for awards of attorneys' fees).
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which are almost by nature class based, constituted less than two percent
of the courts' Title VII caseload during that decade."' 1
Although some might argue that a decline in hiring discrimination
cases signals the disappearance of discrimination from the labor market,
Donohue and Siegelman suggest 82 and recent investigations indicate that
this is not the case. For example, a study by the Urban Institute
involving black and white testers in Washington, D.C. and Chicago,
Illinois provides substantial evidence that discrimination against black
applicants for employment is still widespread.8 3 A similar study con-
ducted by the Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington in 1990
and 1991 revealed that black testers received outcomes less favorable
than white testers 24% of the time, and that Hispanic testers were
treated less favorably than white testers 22% of the time.1M4 In those
cases in which job offers were given to both white and black testers,
employers offered whites a higher initial wage 16.7% of the time.8 5 Yet
a third tester study conducted by the General Accounting Office found
that Hispanic testers were three times more likely to receive unfavor-
able treatment, receiving 25% fewer interviews and 34% fewer job
offers than white testers with the same qualifications.'
The effect is not confined to race and ethnicity. In a 1995 study,
researcher David Neumark and his collaborators sent resumes of male
and female applicants with the same qualifications to restaurants in
Philadelphia. In the high-priced restaurants, male applicants were more
than twice as likely to be called for an interview and five times more
likely to be offered employment than female applicants.8 7
Discrimination in employment persists in the American labor mar-
ket. Changes in substantive and procedural rules, along with changes in
the standards governing awards of attorneys' fees to prevailing plain-
tiffs, have reduced the effectiveness of the class action and the disparate
impact case as tools for remedying discrimination. Individual disparate
treatment litigation is now the primary mechanism for redressing dis-
crimination in employment. If affirmative action programs are elimi-
nated, and with them incentives for ensuring that women and minorities
181. See id. at 989, 998.
182. See id. at 1015, 1019.
183. See MARGERY A. TURNER ET AL., OPPORTUNITIES DENIED, OPPORTUNITIES DIMINISHED:
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING (showing white testers 16% more likely to receive job offers
than black testers).
184. See Marc Bendick, Jr. et al., Measuring Employment Discrimination Through Controlled
Experiments, 23 REv. BLACK POL. ECON. 25,29 (1994).
185. See id. at 32.
186. See United States General Accounting Office, Immigration Reform: Employer Sanctions
and the Question of Discrimination, GAOIGDD-90-62 (1990).
187. See DAvID NEUMARK ET AL., SEx DISCRIMINATION IN RESTAURANT HIRING: AN AUDIT
STUDY 7-10 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5024, 1995).
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remain proportionately represented in a particular job category or edu-
cational program, the search for individual instances of discrimination
will assume even greater significance in the implementation of the
nation's equal opportunity policy. In essence, enforcement of the
nation's stated commitment to equal employment opportunity has
already come to depend, and absent affirmative action programs will
even more substantially depend, on the ability of individual victims to
recognize that they have been discriminated against, and on the ability
of juries and other fact finders' t accurately to discern whether discrimi-
nation has occurred.
The individual disparate treatment case is an extremely weak
enforcement tool, poorly calculated to do the task assigned it in a post-
affirmative action environment. Many of the arguments supporting this
view have been developed elsewhere and need not be repeated here.' 89
My present purpose is to show, from a social and cognitive psychologi-
cal perspective, that reliance on the individual disparate treatment
adjudications will result in the significant underidentification of dis-
crimination, not only by decision makers, as I have argued previously,' 90
but by victims and fact finders as well.
The basis for this claim can be summarized as follows. First, as a
simple consequence of cognitive constraint, people are relatively poor
at identifying discrimination on a case-by-case as opposed to aggregate
basis. This difficulty is exacerbated when discrimination is "non-
prototypical:" when it fails to reflect people's expectations as to what
discrimination looks like.
Furthermore, people have difficulty noticing things that do not
happen in comparison to things that do. Thus, the subtle forms of
ingroup preference which constitute what social cognition theorists
refer to as "Type II discrimination,"' 9' can be expected to go largely
unnoticed by both victims and decision makers. Over time, these subtle,
188. Throughout this Section, I use the term "fact finders" in the broad sense-to refer not only
to judges in bench trials, but also to human resources professionals, government equal opportunity
administrators, alternative dispute resolution providers, and legal advisers responsible for reviewing
challenged decisions and deciding whether to take or recommend voluntary remedial action.
189. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 42, at 1238-39 (predicting a high false negative error rate in
disparate treatment adjudications under current legal standards); David A. Strauss, The Lmv and
Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEo. L. J.
1619 (1991) (arguing from an economic efficiency standpoint that objectives of the antidiscrimination
laws are not best served by trying to detect individual acts of discrimination and suggesting that the
error rate in disparate treatment adjudication is likely to be high). See also Thomas A. Cunniff, The
Price of Equal Opportunity: The Efficiency of Title VII After Hicks, 45 CASE W. REs. L REv. 507
(1995) (arguing that the Court's decision in St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993), has
decreased the efficiency of Title VII by increasing the probability of false negative error in disparate
treatment adjudications).
190. See Krieger, supra note 42, at 1213-15.
191. See infra text accompanying notes 226-227.
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incremental forms of advantage result in the creation of objective dis-
parities between the qualifications of preferred ingroup versus non-
preferred outgroup members. By the time a negative action is taken,
noticed by the victim, and made the subject of a discrimination claim,
the claim frequently can be successfully defended on the grounds that
the favored employee or applicant was "objectively more qualified."
Thus fact finders, as well as victims and decision makers, are unlikely to
recognize discrimination caused by Type II bias.
Finally, determining whether discrimination has occurred is largely
an exercise in causal attribution. Unfortunately, the same biases in
causal attribution that commonly distort intergroup perception and
judgment and result in unintentional forms of discrimination can be
expected to distort fact-finder determinations as to whether discrimina-
tion has occurred in any particular case. We cannot expect the strength
or direction of intergroup decision-maker bias to vary significantly
from the strength or direction of intergroup fact-finder bias. To the
contrary, the level of decision-maker bias in a given judicial district will
likely be mirrored by the level of fact-finder bias in that district. Dispa-
rate treatment adjudication therefore can be expected to pack little
"socio-therapeutic" power in either identifying or remedying subtle
forms of intergroup bias. In fact, the conceptual structure of disparate
treatment analysis can be expected to potentiate stereotypes, thus
exacerbating fact-finder bias and increasing the incidence of false nega-
tive error in formal or informal' 92 disparate treatment adjudications.
1. Individualized Adjudication and the Problem of Case-By-Case Data
In a 1986 experiment, psychologist Faye Crosby and her colleagues
at Yale University1 93 sought to explore the effect of format on subjects'
abilities to discern patterns of discrimination in data reflecting com-
parative levels of compensation accorded male and female managers at
a hypothetical company. Male subjects were provided with a set of
materials about "Company Z," comprised of ten different departments.
The materials were constructed so that the women in the company
earned, on the average, significantly less than the men, controlling for
various input factors such as position, seniority, education, and supervi-
sory rating. In one condition, subjects first received the relevant infor-
mation in aggregated form-data reflecting salary and performance on
the input variables for a typical man and a typical woman from each of
192. By "informal" disparate treatment adjudications I refer to management or government
administrative review of contested decisions, internal grievance procedures, and various forms of
alternative dispute resolution.
193. See Faye Crosby et al., Cognitive Biases in the Perception of Discrimination: The
Importance of Format, 14 Sax ROLES 637 (1986).
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the ten departments was systematically arranged on a single large page.
After viewing this material, subjects were asked whether sex discrimina-
tion existed in the company as a whole. 94 After seeing the information
in aggregate form, subjects were then shown the same data on a depart-
ment by department basis, and were asked to make serial judgments
about each department.
In a second condition, researchers reversed the order of these two
steps. Thus subjects were first asked to make serial department by
department judgments, based on disaggregated data about each depart-
ment. They were then shown the aggregated data and asked to deter-
mine whether sex discrimination existed in the company as a whole.
Crosby and her colleagues learned that format had a significant
effect on subjects' abilities to identify sex-linked disparities embedded in
the stimulus materials. When information was presented on a depart-
ment by department basis, subjects perceived significantly less discrimi-
nation than when the same information was presented in aggregated
form. Whether the aggregated data or the disaggregated data was pre-
sented first made little difference.' In both conditions, subjects more
easily identified discrimination when information was presented on a
company-wide basis than on a department by department basis.
One could criticize the Crosby study on the grounds that in the
aggregated format, subjects were asked to make determinations regard-
ing discrimination in the company as a whole, whereas in the disaggre-
gated format they were asked to make determinations about
discrimination in one particular department, as to which they had much
less information. Thus, the results obtained could have simply reflected
subjects' quite rational unwillingness to draw conclusions based on a
small data set rather than on any effect of format, per se.
To correct this problem, Stanford researcher Diane Cordova repli-
cated Crosby's 1986 study with a modified experimental design. 96
Cordova's subjects reviewed data in one of three different formats:
aggregate, case-by-case/immediate judgment, and case-by-case/delayed
judgment. The aggregate condition was the same as in the original
194. Based on criticisms that use of the emotionally-charged term "sex discrimination" might
have influenced the result, another research term was substituted. Instead of being asked to judge
whether sex discrimination existed, subjects were asked to discern differences in the patterns of
compensation for managers at a hypothetical Plant A and Plant B. Catherine Twiss et al., Affirmative
Action and Aggregate Data: The Importance of Patterns in the Perception of Discrimination, in
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PERSPECrvE 159 (Fletcher A. Blanchard & Faye J. Crosby eds., 1989).
The results obtained by Twiss and her colleagues replicated those in Crosby's original 1986 study.
195. Nor did self-reported political ideology significantly effect the results. Subjects labeling
themselves as feminist and subjects labeling themselves as "anti-feminist" were equally susceptible to
the effects of information format. See id. at 643.
196. See Diane I. Cordova, Cognitive Limitations and Affirmative Action: The Effects of
Aggregate Versus Sequential Data in the Perception of Discrimination, 5 Soc. JusT. RES. 319 (1992).
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Crosby study: relevant input factor and salary information for all ten
departments was arranged for subjects' review on one large page. In the
case-by-case/immediate judgment condition, subjects were presented
with the same information one department at a time, with the order of
the departments randomized to control for primacy effects. After the
information for each department was presented, subjects were asked to
state whether that information indicated the existence of sex discrimi-
nation in that particular department. In the case-by-case/delayed judg-
ment condition, subjects were presented with the relevant information
on the same department by department basis, but reviewed such infor-
mation for each of the ten departments before proffering a single judg-
ment as to discrimination in the company as a whole.
1 97
The results were striking. Subjects, whether male or female, more
readily identified sex discrimination in the aggregate condition than in
either the case-by-case/immediate judgment condition or, more impor-
tantly, in the case-by-case/delayed judgment condition.198 Perhaps even
more striking, although subjects in the aggregated and case-by-case
conditions were similarly able to recall both the discrepancies in male
versus female salary levels and the substantial equivalencies in male and
female performance, subjects in the aggregate condition were signifi-
cantly more willing to label the discrepancies in salary as sex discrimi-
nation than were the other subjects.1 99
The implications of these findings are readily apparent. Unless and
until they file suit, individual victims of discrimination rarely have
access to comparison information about even one other applicant or
employee, let alone aggregated data for a department or company as a
whole. Fact finders, like victims, are also unlikely to have access to this
kind of information. It is expensive, and in light of its potential disclo-
sure and hostile use in future discrimination litigation, risky to compile.
While equal employment opportunity/affirmative action departments
once routinely collected such information, and used it to scrutinize hir-
ing, promotion, and compensation decisions for AA/EEO compliance,
such departments and standards have largely disappeared from the cor-
porate landscape.2 10 Human resources professionals and government
bureaucrats reviewing challenged decisions are frequently presented only
with information concerning "the case at hand," that is, information
comparing characteristics of a particular complainant with characteris-
tics of a single successful applicant or employee. In discharge situations,
these decision makers frequently render judgments without reviewing
197. See id. at 326.
198. See id. at 328.
199. See id. at 329.
200. See generally THoMAs BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION (1991).
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any comparison information at all, let alone systematically organized,
aggregate data reflecting on company-wide patterns.
Like subjects in the format studies, these informal fact finders are
unlikely to see discrimination in such case-by-case information. The
reasons for this are obvious. When presented in anecdotal form, differ-
ences in treatment are too easily attributed to observed differences in
one or another input variable.
For example, individual employment discrimination plaintiffs
often fail in their attempts to convince courts that the more favorable
treatment of an employee of a different race or gender evidences inter-
group bias. In many of these "comparability" cases, courts point to
observed differences in the precise circumstances surrounding the two
incidents and hence find that the employees compared were not
"similarly situated.201 Because two situations are rarely identical in all
respects, and because differences in treatment are easily attributed to
these differences rather than to discrimination, it is easy to miss the
role played by intergroup bias when incidents are considered in isolation.
Only when aggregated data are presented in a systematic way can one
see these differences cancel each other out, revealing underlying pat-
terns of disparity in the treatment of members of different groups.
Aggregated information, like that presented in the Crosby, Twiss,
and Cordova studies, may even be unavailable to fact finders in more
formalized individual disparate treatment adjudications. Internal or
alternative dispute resolutions procedures rarely provide complainants
with access to the breadth of information required to prepare systemati-
cally organized aggregated data. This situation may persist even when
cases go to court. In individual disparate treatment litigation, defendants
frequently, and often successfully, resist discovery targeted at depart-
ments or units other than that in which the plaintiff was employed on
the theory that only decisions made by the particular supervisor whose
action plaintiff is challenging is relevant.20 Thus, even those victims of
201. See Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, 964 F.2d 577, 583-84 (1992) (holding that a black
employee who was fired after hiding a file from a supervisor as a "practical joke" was not similarly
situated with white employees who were not fired for insubordination or absenteeism); Moore v.
Charlotte, 754 F.2d 1100, 1107 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that black officer demoted for fixing a traffic
ticket in exchange for money not comparable to white officers who were not demoted after fixing
traffic tickets for friends); Talley v. U.S. Postal Serv., 720 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that mail
carrier who lost keys on two occasions is not comparable to others who lost keys on one occasion);
Meyer v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Co., 662 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding female employee
who wrote memo containing racist comments, which fell into hands of black employees and made
them angry, not comparable to male employee who made racist comments that did not stir anger in
black employees).
202. See, e.g., Jones v. Frank, 973 F.2d 673, 676 (8th Cir. 1992); Scales v. J.C. Bradford & Co.,
925 F.2d 901, 906-07 (6th Cir. 1991); Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1541 (1Ith Cir. 1989); Cooper
v. North Olmsted, 795 F.2d 1265, 1271 (6th Cir. 1986); Prouty v. National R.t. Passenger Corp., 99
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discrimination who overcome their own cognitive limitations in per-
ceiving discrimination, find a lawyer to represent them, and file suit,
may be unable to present information in a manner calculated to afford
them success. If, in a post-affirmative action environment, the individ-
ual disparate treatment case becomes our primary equal opportunity
policy tool, and if victims, jurors, and other fact finders have access
only to anecdotal or case-by-case information, we can reasonably pre-
dict a significant under-identification of discrimination which no other
policy tool will be available to address.
2. Individual Adjudication and the Problem of Schematic
Expectancies
As we have seen, people have a hard time recognizing discrimina-
tion on a case-by-case basis. They have an even harder time recognizing
discrimination when it is not prototypical, that is, when it does not fit
preexisting ideas about what discrimination looks like. In this regard,
discrimination is not particularly different than other social phenomena
that may become the subject of legal adjudication. As Albert Moore sug-
gests, jurors in a variety of subject matter contexts decide cases by
matching the evidence presented at trial with elements of their sche-
matic expectancies or prototypes of cases of the sort at issue.203 To the
extent that the story presented by one or the other party at trial
corresponds with jurors' internal, schematic frames of reference, that
party's case will seem plausible and persuasive and will be more likely to
succeed.
Most people have preconceived notions about what discrimination
looks like. These "discrimination schemas" generally include a number
of standard features. First, people assume that discrimination is inten-
tional-that the discriminating decision maker knows that he is taking
the target's group status into account in making the decision, and means
to do so. Evidence of this common schematic expectancy is well-
illustrated in the lead opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,204 in
which Justice Brennan wrote:
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employ-
ment decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the
moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we received
a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the
applicant or employee was a woman.
20 5
F.R.D. 545,548 (D.C. Cir. 1983); James v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579, 582 (10th Cir.
1979); Suggs v. Capital CitiesIABC, Inc., 122 F.RD. 430,431-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
203. See Albert J. Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L
REv. 273, 276 (1989).
204. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
205. Id. at 250.
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Decision-maker consistency is a second standard feature. If a per-
son discriminates against members of a particular gender, racial, or
ethnic group, we expect him to do so consistently. We assume a par-
ticular decision maker is unlikely to have a "taste for discrimination""2 6
one day and not the next. For this reason, many courts have adopted
what is known as the same actor doctrine, 2°7 holding that if the same
person who hired an employee makes the decision to fire him, a strong
inference or presumption of non-discrimination arises. 211 This inference
is seen as justified because "it hardly makes sense to hire workers from a
group one dislikes (thereby incurring the psychological costs of associ-
ating with them), only to fire them once they are on the job."209
Indeed, if discrimination is seen as resulting from a "taste" or stable
preference, it is hard to understand why a person might be hired in spite
of the preference, only to be fired later to satisfy it. Furthermore, if
one views discrimination as resulting from a stable ex ante preference,
one will expect all members of a disfavored social group to be accorded
similar negative treatment. Because people assume that discrimination
will operate in this way, defendants are often successful in using evi-
dence of fair treatment of members of the claimant's group to prove
that discrimination did not occur.210
206. Economists use the term "taste for discrimination" to describe an aversion to workers of a
particular race, sex, national origin, or religion under conditions in which all groups of workers are
equally productive. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DisctINATION, 14, 39-
55 (1957); John J. Donahue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L REv. 1411, 1415-20 (1986).
207. Regarding the same actor doctrine, see generally, Marlinee C. Clark, Discrimination Claims
and "Same Actor" Facts: Inference or Evidence?, U. MEM. L. Rav. 183 (1997).
208. Many circuit courts have adopted the same actor doctrine in Title VII cases alleging
disparate treatment in termination. See, e.g., Grady v. Affiliated Century, Inc., 130 F. 3d 553, 560
(2nd Cir. 1997); Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F. 3d 267, 270-71 (9th Cir. 1996); Brown v.
CSC Logic, Inc. 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996); Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv. Co., 80
F.3d 954, 959 (4th Cir. 1996); E.E.O.C. v. Our Lady of Resurrection Med. Ctr., 77 F.3d 145, 152 (7th
Cir. 1996); Burhmaster v. Ovemite Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461, 463 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1078 (1996); Rand v. CF Indus., Inc., 42 F.3d 1139, 1147 (7th Cir. 1994); LeBlane v. Great Am.
Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 847 (1st Cir. 1993); Lowe v. J. B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 963 F.2d 173, 175 (8th Cir.
1992). See also, Williams v. Vitro Serv. Corp., 144 F.3d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir. 1998) (rejecting same
actor doctrine as a presumption, but permitting it as an inference). As this Article goes to press, only
the Third Circuit has rejected the same actor doctrine. See Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc. 56 F.3d 491,
496, n. 6 (3rd Cir. 1995) (holding that same actor facts are simply evidence, like any other, and
should not be accorded any special presumptive value.)
209. Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991), citing, John J. Donohue & Peter B.
Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L REv. 983,
1017 (1991).
210. See, e.g., Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1406 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding
unfavorable treatment of plaintiff insufficient to support an inference of discriminatory animus when
other minorities were accorded the same treatment as non-minority employees); Jefferies v. Harris
County Community Action Ass'n., 615 F.2d 1025, 1030 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that plaintiff failed to
prove race discrimination based on evidence that an employee of the same race had been promoted);
see also Brazer v. St. Regis Paper Co., 498 F. Supp. 1092, 1098 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (finding that
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Third, we generally think of discrimination as stemming from hos-
tility or negative animus. For this reason, we speak of discrimination
against members of other groups, rather than, for example, discrimina-
tion in favor of members of our own group." Given that we think of
discrimination as reflecting a kind of hostility, we expect it to be
expressed in objectively unfair treatment of target group members and
to be accompanied by racist or sexist comments, or other direct evi-
dence of negative animus. The prototypical discriminator is either a
sexist, an ageist, or some other kind of bigot, and he treats members of
the disfavored groups objectively unfairly.
Finally, the prevailing discrimination schema reflects an assump-
tion that invidious animus trumps other factors that would, absent dis-
crimination, be used to make the contested decision. This belief in the
independence of discrimination explains the view, embedded in disparate
treatment jurisprudence, that where racial or gender bias exists, it com-
monly operates as the sole motive for a discriminatory employment
decision. According to this view, intergroup bias supplants rather than
distorts a decision maker's evaluation of legitimate input variables. Per-
haps for this reason, "mixed motive" cases are conceived in Title VII
disparate treatment jurisprudence as the exception and "sole motive" or
"pretext" cases the rule.
212
The standard discrimination schema might be encapsulated as fol-
lows: discrimination occurs when a sexist, racist, or otherwise bigoted
person makes decisions about members of a targeted group. Because of
his negative feelings towards or beliefs about members of the disfavored
group, the discriminator purposefully treats them unfairly. His negative
feelings are likely to be expressed in racist or sexist comments. Even if
the discriminator does not express these negative feelings, he knows of
them and would admit them were he being honest. The kind of prejudice
that leads to discrimination functions like a personality trait: it is
something that exists inside the discriminator. It is relatively stable and
expresses itself consistently over time and across different situations.
I have attempted elsewhere to discredit the assumptions of inten-
tionality and independence embedded in the prevailing discrimination
schema.213 I seek here to question two other assumptions: the
replacement of plaintiff with an employee of the same race undermined his claim of race
discrimination injob assignment).
211. This implicit assumption, that intergroup bias manifests as negative action taken against
outgroup members, is reflected in the language of Title VII itself. The statute makes it unlawful for
an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge... or otherwise discriminate against any
individual" because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
212. For a thorough discussion of this "sole motive fallacy," and its effect on disparate treatment
theory, see Krieger, supra note 42, at 1178-79, 1223-24.
213. See id. at 1168-77, 1181-85.
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expectation of consistency and the expectation of unfair treatment of
outgroup members.
a. Schematic Expectancies and the Problem of Complexity
As we have seen, many people-among them federal district and
circuit court judges and law and economics scholars-seem to believe
that discrimination derives from a kind of taste, or stable preference,
that expresses itself consistently over time and across varying situa-
tions.214 In this regard, intergroup bias is seen as functioning much like a
personality trait.
Even if discrimination derived primarily from such a taste or pref-
erence, any model based on this assumption and predicting consistent
decision making would be seriously flawed. Empirical social psychology
has to a great extent discredited the assumption that people behave
consistently over time and across different situations in conformity
with stable preferences and personality traits.215 Even those researchers
who support a relatively "strong" theory of personality acknowledge
that the relationship between traits and behaviors depends significantly
on the situations in which behaviors occur.16
Let us assume that at least a substantial proportion of discrimina-
tory decisions derive, as law and economics scholars suppose, from
tastes or preferences. Let us further assume, as empirical social and per-
sonality psychology has established, that the relationship between such
tastes or preferences on the one hand and behavior on the other
depends significantly on the situation in which the actor finds himself.
To these, let us add the further assumption that a second, substantial set
of discriminatory decisions derive not from tastes or preferences, but
from the operation of subtle, largely cognitive forms of intergroup bias,
and from the operation of judgmental heuristics such as the salience and
polarized evaluation effects described in Part I above. The expression of
these biases, like the relationship between personality traits and behav-
iors, are situation-dependent.
If we accept the proposition that the expression of tastes and pref-
erences is situationally determined, and if we accept the proposition
that much discrimination derives not from tastes or preferences at all
214. See discussion supra, in text accompanying notes 206-213.
215. For a comprehensive overview of social psychological research suggesting the weakness of
global trait constructs as reliable predictors of behavior and choice, see generally LEE Ross &
RICHARD E. NisBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION (1991).
216. See, e.g., Walter Mischel & Yuichi Shoda, A Cognitive-Affective System Theory of
Personality: Reconceptualizing Situations, Dispositions, Dynamics, and Invariance in Personality
Structure, 102 PSYCHOL. REv. 246 (1995); Yuichi Shoda et al., Links Between Personality Judgments




but from the operation of various situation sensitive cognitive biases
and heuristics, a startling conclusion follows. Cognitive processes of
perception and judgment, both those that lead to judgment error
directly and those that moderate the expression of traits or preferences,
are not characterized by the simple, almost hydraulic patterns of cause
and effect embedded in the prevailing discrimination schema. Rather,
they are characterized by complexity.
By this I mean that many different heuristics, biases, and other
judgmental influences, such as primacy, recency, or contrast effects, not
to mention motivational influences, will bear simultaneously on any
given social judgment task. Accordingly, discrimination caused by situa-
tion-sensitive or cognitive forms of intergroup bias will not operate
consistently. Quite the contrary, the operation and effects of these
forms of bias will vary considerably from context to context, as is char-
acteristic of complex systems. Therefore, we can predict that inter-
group bias will cause discrimination. But we cannot say that intergroup
bias will always cause discrimination to occur, nor can we predict
exactly when discrimination will occur. We might not even be able to
identify when discrimination has occurred.
In short, we cannot expect systems in which cognitive or other
situation-sensitive forms of bias are operating to present neat, consis-
tent patterns of outgroup subordination. The resulting disparities may
be less conspicuous. They may be expressed as disparities of magnitude
rather than disparities of kind. They may not be statistically significant.
They may not present a simple story, easy to tell and consistent with
fact finders' schematic expectancies.
Although the implications of this insight could easily expand into a
separate article, two points illustrating its significance will serve our
present purposes. The first point is this: if people believe that dis-
crimination results from ex ante preferences which manifest consis-
tently over time and across different situations, people will have a hard
time understanding, for example, how a biased decision maker would
make both the decision to hire and the decision to fire a protected class
member. Second, if people expect discrimination to be expressed as
consistent patterns of outgroup subordination rather than as a set of
tendencies which, over time, result in inconsistent but nonetheless sub-
stantial disparities in distribution, much discrimination will go unrecog-
nized, and for that reason, unredressed. Let us look a little more closely
at each of these problems, and consider their implications for post-
affirmative action equal opportunity policy.
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i. Of Single Actors, Ex Ante Preferences, and the Situation-
Dependent Nature of Biased Decision Making
Consider again the same actor doctrine,217 which provides that
where the same person is responsible for both hiring and firing an
employee, an inference or presumption should arise that there was no
discrimination in the decision to fire. The implicit theory about what
discrimination is and how it operates reflected in this doctrine is clearly
reflected in the Seventh Circuit's opinion in E.E.O.C. v. Resurrection
Medical Center."8 In Resurrection Medical Center, the court observed,
"If Boettcher [the decision maker] wanted to discriminate against
Braddy [the discharged employee] because of her race, she could have
refused to hire her in the first place." ' 9 This observation reflects an
important assumption-that discrimination in hiring and discrimination
in discharge are caused by the same thing, namely a stable taste or pref-
erence for social distance. According to this view, intergroup biases-
whether borne of stereotypes or of outright antipathy-serve as ex ante
decision rules, equally applicable to hiring or discharge decisions. If the
ex ante rule was not applied in the hiring context, it is hard to under-
stand why it would be applied in a decision to discharge. Within its own
assumptive universe, the single actor inference makes good sense. But
there is substantial reason to believe that its underlying assumptions are
wrong, that this is simply not how discrimination works, at least not
discrimination deriving from implicit stereotypes about the aptitudes
and abilities associated with different demographic groups.
In this regard, consider a well-known study by Princeton psycholo-
gists John Darley and Paget Gross investigating the nature and function
of a phenomenon known as the "cognitive confirmation effect."220 This
effect occurs when people with different expectancies are exposed to
the same information about a target person. Even though they review
the same information or view the same series of events, perceivers with
opposite preconceptions tend to emerge with their expectancies con-
finned. Darley and Gross sought to identify the specific cognitive
processes that mediate this phenomenon.
In their study, Darley and Gross had subjects view one or two
videotapes, each portraying a school age child named "Hannah." By
manipulating the content of the first videotape, Darley and Gross led
subjects to believe that Hannah's family was either disadvantaged or
affluent. So, in the "low income" condition, the video depicted Hannah
217. See supra discussion accompanying notes 207-209.
218. 77 F.3d 145 (7th Cir. 1996).
219. Id. at 152.
220. See John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling Effects, 44
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 20 (1983).
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playing in a stark, fenced-in, asphalt school yard in a run-down urban
neighborhood. Researchers told subjects in this condition that Hannah's
parents had only a high school education, that her father worked as a
meat packer, and that her mother was a seamstress who worked at
home.
In the "high income" condition, subjects watched Hannah play in a
tree-lined park in an upper middle class neighborhood. The video
depicted her school as a large, attractive modem structure, with adjacent
playing fields and a shaded playground. It described her father as an
attorney, her mother as a free-lance writer.
Immediately after subjects watched one or the other of these
videotapes, a subgroup of subjects in each income condition was asked
to predict whether Hannah would perform academically "at grade
level," "above grade level," or "below grade level." Reluctantly, and
often under protest over the paucity of diagnostic information they had
received, subjects in both conditions tended to predict that Hannah
would perform "at grade level." In other words, they refused to form, or
at least express, an initial prediction based on the stereotypes about
academic achievement associated with high and low socioeconomic
status.
Rather than immediately predicting Hannah's ability level, a sec-
ond subgroup in each income condition watched a second videotape.
This second videotape, which was identical across both conditions,
depicted Hannah responding verbally to twenty five achievement test
problems. Researchers told subjects that the test included easy, moder-
ate, and difficult problems. Researchers manipulated Hannah's perform-
ance in this second video so as to be ambiguous.
After watching this second video, subjects in the low-income and
high-income conditions were asked to evaluate Hannah's abilities. At
this point, dramatic differences emerged. Subjects in the "affluent
Hannah" condition rated her academic ability significantly higher than
did subjects in the "disadvantaged Hannah" condition. Open-ended
comments revealed differences in perception as well. For example, sub-
jects frequently reported the low-income Hannah as having "difficulty
accepting new information," while they frequently described high-
income Hannah as demonstrating the "ability to apply what she knows
to unfamiliar problems.
'22'
Darley and Gross interpreted their findings as suggesting that expo-
sure to mixed or ambiguous diagnostic information actually potentiates
social stereotypes. People do not believe it appropriate to base social
predictions or judgments on stereotypes. Accordingly, when asked to




protested and kept their predictions close to a neutral mean. Nonethe-
less, these same stereotypes eschewed by subjects in the immediate
response condition found expression in social evaluation tasks per-
formed in a more "information rich" context. How?
Darley and Gross answered this question by suggesting that stereo-
types function not as consistent ex ante decision rules, but as dormant
expectancies, which become activated when people hear about or
observe the actions of a stereotyped other. Through the mediation of
various cognitive processes, including selective attention, biased inter-
pretation and attribution, and differential recall, a person's judgment is
more powerfully influenced by expectancy-consistent information than
by expectancy-inconsistent information. In this way, two people can
view precisely the same sequence of events and reach radically different
conclusions, depending on their prior expectancies.
The implications of these findings for disparate treatment theory
in general, and for the same actor inference in particular, should be
obvious. Not all discrimination results from the application of tastes or
preferences, expressing themselves as consistent, ex ante decision rules.
Discrimination sometimes results from the operation of implicit stereo-
types which bias the interpretation, retention, and utilization of in-
coming mixed or ambiguous information. The same decision maker
who, when individuating information is sparse, refuses to make an initial
negative prediction based on stereotypes, may, like the subjects in
Darley and Gross's study, fall prey to their biasing effect as more osten-
sibly diagnostic information becomes available. Cognitive forms of
intergroup bias will not operate consistently, even in the same decision
maker. Their expression will vary, according to the specific situation in
which the decision maker finds himself. A fact finder looking for con-
sistent patterns of discrimination is apt to see no discrimination at all.
ii. Expectations of Consistency and the Search for Ordinal Inequity
As we have seen, people have difficulty recognizing discrimination
when it is not conspicuous and consistent. In a dramatic illustration of
this effect, social psychologist Susan Clayton demonstrated that subjects
were unable to recognize patterns of sex discrimination in compensa-
tion when the differences in salary were small or inconsistent, or when
some women were paid more than some men. Subjects were particularly
poor at recognizing discrimination when women's salaries were slightly
less or equivalent to the men's salaries but the women were substantially
better qualified along given salary-relevant dimensions.
22
222. See Susan D. Clayton, The Recognition of Discrimination in a Minimal-Information Format,
Paper Presented at the 97th Meeting of the American Psychological Association (August 1989),
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Extending these results, Christel Rutte and her colleagues showed
that people are quite poor at detecting discrimination when it is incon-
spicuous, or when information is presented in piecemeal rather than
aggregate form. In particular, their study showed that discrimination is
especially difficult to detect when principles of "ordinal equity" are not
violated.
Ordinal inequity exists when an employee who ranks higher on
relevant input variables (e.g., qualifications) ranks lower than some
other employee on the relevant outcome variables (e.g., salary, job
title, rank or grade),24 Magnitudes of difference do not implicate ordinal
equity. In Rutte's study, when researchers gave advantages to majority
group members in unobtrusive ways, not violating principles of ordinal
equity, subjects generally failed to recognize patterns of disparate
treatment. Perhaps more significantly, even where subjects recognized
these less obtrusive patterns of sex-linked disparity, they were unlikely
to characterize them as unfair.22
In summary, people expect discrimination to result in conspicuous,
consistent patterns of outgroup subordination. But subtle forms of
intergroup bias, while they will disadvantage the outgroup over time, are
unlikely to produce such neat, consistent outcomes. We can reasonably
predict that the kind of disadvantage resulting from cognitive forms of
intergroup bias will frequently go unrecognized by fact finders (or per-
haps even victims) as reflecting patterns of inequality. Even if fact
finders recognize such patterns of disparity, absent violation of ordinal
equity, they are unlikely to label them as unfair or discriminatory.
Affirmative action programs, which emphasize the maintenance of
numerical standards and the examination of broad patterns of distribu-
tion, have circumvented these problems. If affirmative action is elimi-
nated, we cannot rely on remaining tools to achieve the same result.
b. Schematic Expectancies and the Problem of Ingroup Favoritism
When we think of discrimination, we think of discrimination
against members of various outgroups. But as psychologist Marilynn
Brewer observes, there are different types of intergroup bias.2 6 From a
psychological and policy standpoint, these differ in important ways.
described in JUSTICE, GENDER, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 79-81 (Susan D. Clayton & Faye J.
Crosby eds., 1992).
223. See Christel G. Rutte et al., Organization of Information and the Detection of Gender
Discrimination, 5 PSYCHOLOGICAL Sci. 226 (1994).
224. See id. at 226.
225. See id. at 229-30.
226. See Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Favoritism: The Subtle Side of Intergroup
Discrimination, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH AND BUSINESS ETHIcS 160 (David
M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996).
1998] 1317
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
The first type Brewer identifies is bias or discrimination against the
outgroup. In the case of Type I discrimination, the discriminator treats
members of the outgroup unfairly, while members of the ingroup are
treated neutrally with reference to some standard metric of fairness.
Type II discrimination favors the ingroup. Here, treatment of the in-
group is biased in a positive or lenient direction, whereas treatment of
the outgroup goes "by the book." Roberto da Matta encapsulates this
type of discrimination in his description of Brazilian legal cul-
ture: "[f]or my friends, everything; for my enemies, the law!"227 Type
III involves both discrimination in favor of the ingroup and discrimina-
tion against the outgroup.
As noted earlier, both existing civil rights statutes and popular con-
ceptions of discrimination assume Type I discrimination-negative
treatment of outgroup members in relation to some objective metric of
fairness. So, when a person claims to have been discriminated against,
we tend to look for evidence that she was treated unfairly. For example,
we look for deviations from established policies or procedures. If we
find them, we interpret such deviations as evidencing discriminatory
intent.228 If the complainant does not appear to have been treated
unfairly, we tend to conclude that no discrimination occurred. 229
The tendency for discrimination disputes to center on the negative
treatment of outgroup members, which no doubt reflects and reinforces
the assumption of Type I discrimination, is driven both by the eco-
nomics of discrimination litigation and by the effects of various cogni-
tive biases. From an economic standpoint, unless a discrimination
victim has suffered a substantial economic loss, such as employment
termination, litigation will in most circumstances be unfeasible.
Psychological factors may play a role as well. People react more
negatively to being deprived of something that they have had than to
227. See Roberto da Matta, The Quest for Citizenship in a Relational Universe, in STATE AND
SOCIETY IN BRAZIL 307, 319 (John D. Wirth et al. eds., 1987) (reciting an ancient Brazilian
expression).
228. See, e.g., Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456,466-67 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding plaintiff
could show pretext by demonstrating that the defendant had deviated from established policies and
practices); Odima v. Westin Tuscon Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484, 1492 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding as not clearly
erroneous district court's finding of discrimination based in part on the fact that the defendant had
deviated from established company policies and procedures); Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Finance
Corp., 17 F.3d 1104, 1119 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding defendant's failure to follow layoff and promotion
policies is evidence from which jury could infer discrimination).
229. This implicit assumption of Type I discrimination may account in part for a phenomenon
observed by sociologist Lauren Edelman and her colleagues in their study of corporate human
resources professionals' approach to equal employment opportunity compliance. They observed that
human resources professionals approach discrimination complaints as disputes about procedure, and
tend to recast the obligations imposed by civil rights laws in procedural fairness terms. See Lauren B.
Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27
LAW & Soc'Y REv. 497, 512, 514 (1993).
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being denied something that they have never had. Behavioral econo-
mists and cognitive psychologists refer to this phenomenon as the
"endowment effect."'' 0 From this effect one can reasonably predict that
people will more readily sue over a termination of employment than
over a failure to hire or promote. Finally, as cognitive psychologists
have demonstrated, people are generally less likely to notice things that
do not happen than they are to notice things that do happen.2' Being
fired or subjected to other forms of employment discipline are far more
salient than not being assigned a particular account, not being intro-
duced to important people, or not receiving encouragement, training, or
other forms of mentoring from an influential superior. Accordingly, the
mobilization of civil rights remedies is much more likely to follow the
occurrence of a negative event than the nonoccurrence of a positive
event. This reinforces the underlying cultural assumption of Type I
bias.
However, extensive empirical research in social cognition and
social identity suggests that Type II bias largely underlies the kind of
discrimination that results in the systematic advantaging of white males.
This research divides into three broad types: research on racial atti-
tudes, research on intergroup reward allocation, and research on inter-
group helping behavior and the operation of leniency effects.
i. Evidence of Type II Bias in Racial Attitudes Research
The earliest empirical investigations of racial attitudes relied on
subject self-report?32 Recognizing that social desirability effects might
distort findings in studies of this kind, researchers developed a new
technique for measuring racial attitudes?33 This technique, known as the
response time study, is based on the previously verified insight that
highly associated word pairs (e.g., chicken-egg), produce faster
230. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, in JUDGMENT AND
DECISION-MAKING 194, 207-08 (Hal R. Arkes & Kenneth R. Hammond eds., 1986) (discussing the
cognitive psychology of loss aversion and resulting endowment effects); Richard Thaler, Toward a
Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980) (coining the term
"endowment effect").
231. See, e.g., Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the
Attribution Process, 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173, 196-97 (1977),
reprinted in COGNITIVE THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 337 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1978);
Shelley E. Taylor & Susan T. Fiske, Salience, Attention, and Attribution: Top of the Head Phenomena,
in 11 ADVANCES IN EXPERBIENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 249, 274 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1978).
232. See, e.g., Daniel Katz & Kenneth Braly, Racial Stereotypes of One Hundred College
Students, 28 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOL. 280 (1933-34).
233. See, e.g., Harold Sigall & Richard Page, Current Stereotypes: A Little Fading, A Little
Faking, 18 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 247 (1971).
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responses in word recognition tasks than word pairs that are not associ-
ated (e.g., doctor-butter).
234
In one of the first response time studies, Samuel Gaertner and John
McLaughlin paired the words "black" and "white" with various positive
and negative trait constructs (e.g., smart, stupid, lazy, clean), and meas-
ured subjects' response times in a word recognition task.35 Response
times provided an unobtrusive measure of the strength of subjects' asso-
ciations between the constructs "black" or "white" and various positive
and negative traits. Fast response times indicated the presence of an
association; slower response times indicated the absence of an associa-
tion.
Gaertner and McLaughlin's subjects, who had previously measured
"low prejudice" on a variety of scales, did not more readily associate
negative trait concepts with the word "black." However, they reacted
significantly more quickly when positive trait concepts were paired with
the word "white. ''26 These results suggest that although low prejudice
individuals do not differentially associate negative traits with blacks,
they do more readily associate positive traits with whites.
The results obtained in Gaertner and McLaughlin's early investiga-
tion are consistent with those of subsequent studies of the "ingroup
priming effect." In these experiments, researchers showed that priming
people with references to an outgroup does not systematically result in
the activation of negative trait concepts. But priming them, even sub-
liminally, with references to their ingroup does.237 Dovidio, Evans, and
Tyler found a similar effect using explicitly racial primes.231 Rather than
priming subjects with references to themselves or to a minimal ingroup,
Dovidio and his colleagues primed subjects with references to the words
"black" or "white." Priming subjects with references to "black" did not
result in their responding more quickly to subsequently presented nega-
tive trait concepts. However, priming subjects with references to
"white" did result in their responding more quickly to positive traits.
234. See David E. Meyer & Roger W. Schvaneveldt, Facilitation in Recognizing Pairs of
Words: Evidence of a Dependence Between Retrieval Operations, 90 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.
227 (1971) (demonstrating relationship between association and response latency in word recognition
tasks). For a thorough review of the history of racial attitude research, including the development of
the response time study, see John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Prejudice, Discrimination, and
Racism: Historical Trends and Contemporary Approaches, in PREJuDIcE, DISCRIMINATION &
RACISM 1 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986).
235. See Samuel L. Gaertner & John P. McLaughlin, Racial Stereotypes: Associations and
Ascriptions of Positive and Negative Characteristics, 46 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 23, 24 (1983).
236. See id. at 27.
237. See, e.g., Crocker & Schwarz, supra note 123; C. W. Perdue et al., Us and Them: Social
Categorization and the Process of Intergroup Bias, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 475 (1990).
For a general discussion of these studies, see Bargh, supra note 11, at 9.
238. John F. Dovidio et al., Racial Stereotypes: The Contents of Their Cognitive Representations,
22 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 22 (1986).
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These results and others like them are consistent with the hypothesis
that subtle forms of intergroup bias will manifest more as favoritism
towards the ingroup than as hostility towards the outgroup. 239
ii. Type II Bias in Positive and Negative Distribution Decisions
As described above,24 much of our understanding of subtle forms of
intergroup bias derives from the "minimal group" studies pioneered by
social identity theorist Henri Tajfel and his colleagues.241 Many of these
studies explored patterns of intergroup preference in the allocation of
monetary rewards. Researchers assigned subjects to groups on some
trivial basis, then asked subjects who would not themselves benefit from
allocation decisions to divide prize money between an ingroup and out-
group member.
In one of the earliest of these studies, researchers gave subjects a
variety of allocation options, some of which favored the ingroup mem-
ber, some of which favored the outgroup member, and some of which
resulted in relatively equal allocations. 242 Subjects in this study, as in sub-
sequent replications, 243 rejected those options that resulted in relatively
equal allocations, and instead tended to choose those allocations which
benefited the ingroup member at the expense of the outgroup member.
As Marilynn Brewer notes however, one cannot tell from these results
alone whether subjects are motivated to favor ingroup members or to
disfavor outgroup members.244 Thus, in and of themselves, the early
ingroup reward allocation studies did not necessarily support the Type II
bias hypothesis.
Subsequent studies investigating intergroup biases in the allocation
of negative outcomes, however, do support the Type II bias hypothesis.
In these studies researchers divided subjects into groups using the mini-
mal group technique. They asked subjects to distribute negative out-
comes, in the form of exposure to aversive physical stimuli, and
positive outcomes, in the form of monetary rewards.245 In the positive
239. For a thorough review of the racial and ingroup priming studies, see John F. Dovidio &
Samuel L. Gaertner, Stereotypes and Evaluative Intergroup Bias, in AFFECT, COGNITION, AND
STEREOTYPING 167 (Diane M. Mackie & David L. Hamilton eds., 1993).
240. See discussion in text accompanying note 155.
241. See generally Henri Tajfel, Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination, 223 Sci. AM. 96
(1970) (summarizing early work in this field).
242. See Tajfel et al., supra note 81.
243. For a thorough review of the intergroup reward allocation studies, including subsequent
replications of Tajfel's original 1971 experiment, see Brewer, supra note 80, at 309-13.
244. See id.
245. See Amelie Mummendey et al., Categorization is Not Enough: Intergroup Discrimination in
Negative Outcome Allocation, 28 J. EXPERMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 125 (1992); Miles Hewstone et
al., Social Categorization and Similarity in Intergroup Behaviour: A Replication with Penalties, 11
Eu. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 101 (1981).
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outcome condition, subjects behaved as in previous studies: they chose
the option that most benefited the ingroup member, even though the
equal allocation option would have maximized the total amount of
benefit distributed. 2
46
In the negative allocation condition however, subjects behaved
quite differently. When distributing negative outcomes, subjects pre-
ferred an equal allocation option that minimized the total amount of
harm distributed. These patterns obtained even though subjects could
have selected an option that modestly benefited the ingroup member
and moderately harmed the outgroup member.2 47 Evidently, it is one
thing to benefit an ingroup member when it appears to leave the out-
group member no worse off, and quite another when ingroup gain can be
achieved only at the obvious cost of outgroup harm. These findings too
provide theoretical support for the plausibility of the Type II bias
hypothesis. From them we can reasonably predict that employment
decision makers are more likely to advantage a member of their own
ingroup when they can do so without leaving an outgroup member worse
off.
iii. Ingroup Helping Discrimination and the Leniency Effect
Patterns of modern discrimination turn in large measure on the
answer to one simple question: Who gets cut slack, and who does not?
What happens when an employee violates a rule? Is she subjected to
discipline under established policies, or are her transgressions over-
looked, or attributed to factors beyond her control? When an ambiguous
aspect of a person's background can be interpreted in various ways, one
negative, one neutral, which attribution is made? And when a person
simply needs help, does she receive it?
Type II bias in large measure shapes people's tendencies to assist
or ignore, to excuse others' transgressions or hold them accountable
under objective standards of conduct. The earliest, and perhaps still the
most vivid of the studies illustrating this effect, was conducted in the
246. It is both interesting and important to note that subjects in these experiments rejected the
Pareto optimal choice. (Borrowing the name of Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto, a distribution is said
to be Pareto optimal or Pareto efficient if there is no way to change the distribution such that someone
is made better off without making someone else worse off. Conversely, a distribution is Pareto
inefficient if someone can be made better off without making anyone else worse off. See ROBERT
COOTER & THoMAs ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 12 (2d ed. 1997); A. ITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION To LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 n.4 (2d ed. 1989)). For an analysis of the implications of
these and similar research findings for the law and economics approach to reflecting patterns of
ingroup favoritism, see Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Production andRace Discrimination, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1003 (1995).
247. See Mummendey et al., supra note 245, at 133.
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early 1970s, in front of a Kansas supermarket.248 In this study, one
black woman and one white woman, whom researchers matched for age
and social class-related appearance, dropped a bag of groceries while
leaving a supermarket, right in the path of oncoming shoppers.
Researchers investigated whether white shoppers would help a white
"bag dropper" more frequently than a black bag dropper.
The results were complex and intriguing. Overall, the experiment-
ers found no significant effect of race on the provision of help per
se: approximately the same percentage of incoming white shoppers in
either condition stopped to help.249 Subsequent analysis of the data how-
ever, revealed an important, if more subtle, phenomenon. When the
bag dropper was white, sixty three percent of those who stopped con-
tinued to provide assistance until the job was done. When the bag drop-
per was black, helpers tended to pick up one or two items and then
leave, providing complete assistance only thirty percent of the time. 50
Additional studies provide further evidence of an ingroup helping
bias. In 1977, Samuel Gaertner and John Dovidio conducted an experi-
ment in which white subjects were led to believe that they were partici-
pating in an investigation of extrasensory perception (ESP).251
Researchers assigned subjects to serve as either a "sender" or a
"receiver," and paired each with a partner/confederate, who was either
white or black. Senders and receivers sat in different rooms. Researchers
told some subjects that a second person was sitting with their partner in
the other room, and told other subjects that the partner was alone.
During the course of the "ESP" experiment, researchers staged an
emergency. Subjects heard the sound of falling chairs and the screams of
the partner in the other room, followed by prolonged silence. Research-
ers investigated whether the partner's race would effect the rates at
which subjects would go to the aid of their partner.
When subjects believed that their partner was alone in the other
room, the partner's race had no significant effect on responses2 2 How-
ever, when subjects believed that there was another person in the room
with the partner, race made a dramatic difference. Where the appar-
ently imperiled partner was white, seventy-five percent of subjects
offered aid, but where the partner was black, the rate dropped to thirty-
seven percent .2 3 Perhaps even more significantly, subjects showed
248. See Lauren G. wispe & Harold G. Freshley, Race, Sex, and Sympathetic Helping
Behavior: The Broken Bag Caper, 17 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 59 (1971).
249. See id. at 62.
250. See JAYNE ALLYN PILJAVIN ET AL., EmERGENCY INTERVENTION 158 (1981).
251. See Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Subtlety of White Racism, Arousal, and
Helping Behavior, 35 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 691 (1977).




greater physiological arousal, measured by change in heart rate, when
the partner/confederate was white than when he was black.
254
Gaertner and Dovidio interpreted these results as indicating that
whites do not deliberately avoid providing assistance to blacks. How-
ever, when features of the situation are ambiguous, when it is unclear
whether help is called for, they tend to resolve uncertainty in favor of
helping whites and against helping blacks.2s
Similar results occur when the ambiguity concerns whether help is
deserved as opposed to whether help is needed. So, where the need for
help on a particular task is attributable to a lack of effort, white subjects
provide help to white confederates at a significantly higher rate than
they provide to similarly situated black confederates. 25 6
As the tendency to assist is biased, so is the tendency to overlook
or excuse transgression. For example, in a 1974 field study of whites'
reactions to apparent shoplifting, Max Dertke and his colleagues dem-
onstrated that when the shoplifter/confederate was black, white shop-
pers spontaneously reported and followed up on an observed shoplifting
incident at a much higher rate than when the shoplifter/confederate was
white2
7
A more recent study illustrates a similar Type II leniency effect in
the attribution of positive and negative behaviors. 2 8 Using the minimal
group technique, Joseph Weber divided subjects into groups and then had
them watch ingroup or outgroup confederates either perform or fail to
perform an altruistic act. Where the confederate performed the altruis-
tic act, researchers observed no intergroup bias; subjects even-handedly
attributed the confederate's action to positive personality traits, such as
helpfulness or generosity. Intergroup bias surfaced only when the con-
federate had failed to act. When an outgroup member failed to act, sub-
jects attributed the failure to negative personality traits. But when a
member of the ingroup failed to act, subjects explained the failure as
resulting from situational constraints.29
One can easily see how over time, these subtle forms of ingroup
favoritism would result in markedly different outcomes for ingroup and
outgroup members. If decision makers react to members of their own
social reference groups with more positive associations, a quicker
254. See id. at 698.
255. See id. at 699.
256. See Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in PREJUDICE
DISCRIMINATION AND RACISM 61, 70 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986).
257. See Max C. Dertke et al., Observer's Reporting of Shoplifting as a Function of Thief s Race
and Sex, 94 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 213 (1974).
258. See Joseph G. Weber, The Nature of Ethnocentric Attribution Bias: Ingroup Protection or
Enhancement?, 30 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 482 (1994).
259. See id. at 491.
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willingness to help, and a stronger inclination to ignore or excuse short-
comings, it is easy to predict who will be systematically advantaged in
hiring and promotion decisions. Disparities will develop even absent
hostile animus or negative actions directed towards the outgroup.
c. In-Group Favoritism and the Limitations of Current Law
As it is increasingly being interpreted, Title VII is poorly equipped
to control discrimination resulting from ingroup favoritism. Consider
for example the problem of word-of-mouth recruitment, a process by
which current employees disseminate to their friends information about
job opportunities or suggest those friends to hiring officials as a means
of identifying candidates for openings. Early Title VII cases almost uni-
formly found such hiring procedures discriminatory on the grounds that
employees tend to recommend individuals of their own race and ethnic-
ity, thereby perpetuating patterns of racial or ethnic imbalance. 21 Over
time however, this consensus has eroded. There now exists a split in the
circuits as to whether word-of-mouth recruitment violates Title VII,
even under a disparate impact analysis. 261
The cases refusing to impose liability for word-of-mouth recruit-
ment vividly illustrate the courts' increasing preoccupation with Type I
discrimination and their corresponding inability to recognize the dis-
criminatory effect of Type II bias. For example, in E.E.O.C. v. Chicago
Miniature Lamp Works, Judge Cummings opined:
260. See, e.g., Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 549 (4th Cir. 1975) (finding word-of-
mouth hiring discriminatory because of its tendency to perpetuate the all-white composition of a work
force); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc. 495 F.2d 398, 419-420 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on
other grounds, 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (holding word-of-mouth recruitment discriminatory on a disparate
impact theory); Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972) (stating white
employees tend not to know African Americans who would be qualified to perform the work in
question); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 427 (8th Cir. 1970) (finding existing
white employees tend to refer members of their own race, thus perpetuating racial disparities);
NAACP v. City of Corinth, 83 F.R.D. 46, 62 (N.D. Miss. 1979) (holding prima facie case of disparate
treatment discrimination established by showing that job vacancies were filled by word-of-mouth).
261. Compare Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429, 1435-36 (9th Cir. 1984)
(holding word-of-mouth recruitment in white-dominated workforce discriminatory), and NAACP v.
Evergreen, 693 F.2d 1367, 1369 (11th Cir. 1982) ("[W]ord of mouth [recruitment] undoubtedly
operated to the benefit of white applicants and to reduce the number of potential black
applicants... !), with Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Consol. Service Sys., 989 F.2d 233,
235-36 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding word-of-mouth recruitment does not violate Title VII on either a
disparate treatment or disparate impact theory; it was the most cost-effective form of recruitment,
and there was no evidence of invidious bias against any under-represented group), Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 298-99 (7th Cir.
1991) (holding word-of-mouth recruitment does not violate Title VII), and Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n v. O&G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty Co., 732 F. Supp. 72, 73-74 (N.D. Ill.




Miniature's passive reliance on word-of-mouth to generate
applicants must be given minimal weight because it involved no
affirmative act by Miniature. Drawing the inference of intent
from "non-action" is inherently more difficult than drawing the
inference of intent from particular actions. This is especially
true since intent means more than knowledge that a certain
action (or non-action) will cause certain discriminatory results.
Intent means a subjective desire or wish for these discriminatory
results to occur.2
62
Similarly oblivious to the significance of subtle forms of ingroup
preference involved in "non-action" towards minorities, Judge Posner
writes in E.E.O.C. v. Consolidated Service Systems that if word-of-
mouth recruitment "just happens to produce a work force whose racial
or religious or ethnic or nation-origin or gender composition pleases the
employer, this is not intentional discrimination. The motive is not a
discriminatory one. '263 It would be difficult to find more vivid illustra-
tions of the assumption of Type I bias reflected in Title VII case law.
Thus, even if a nonrecruited individual recognizes that word-of-
mouth recruitment has deprived her of a potential employment oppor-
tunity, and even if such practices serve to perpetuate existing racial or
other imbalances in an employer's workforce, an increasing number of
courts refuse to provide a Title VII remedy. Judicial interpretations of
Title VII are increasingly based on the application of prototypical ex-
pectancies rather than on clear thinking about what intergroup bias is,
what causes it, and how it influences social judgment. Until our civil
rights jurisprudence is premised upon a more complete and accurate un-
derstanding of intergroup bias, those forms of discrimination which dif-
fer from the most superficial schematic expectancies will continue to go
unrecognized and unaddressed.
Ingroup favoritism manifests itself gradually in subtle ways. It is
unlikely to trigger mobilization of civil rights remedies because
instances of this form of discrimination tend to go unnoticed. If they
are noticed, they will frequently seem genuinely trivial or be economi-
cally unfeasible to pursue. By the time some more salient event, such as
a layoff decision or a failure to promote, precipitates a civil rights
challenge, the preferred ingroup and nonpreferred outgroup members
may no longer be similarly situated. Having profited over time from a
series of subtle, incremental advantages, the ingroup member is apt to
be objectively better situated. For this reason as for others, we cannot
expect existing equal opportunity tools adequately to prevent, identify,
or redress this more modem form of discrimination. Eliminating
262. 947 F.2d at 298.
263. 989 F.2d at 235.
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affirmative action without first repairing these deficiencies is a recipe
for racial, ethnic, and gender injustice.
D. Individualized Adjudication, Hypothesis Testing, and
Causal Attribution: The Effects of Intergroup Bias
Consider for a moment the judgment task involved in adjudicating
an individual employment discrimination suit. Determining in any given
case whether discrimination has occurred is fundamentally an exercise in
causal attribution. The employer has taken some negative action, most
frequently a termination of employment, against the plaintiff. The
jury's role is to determine why that negative action was taken. Was it,
as the plaintiff alleges, because the decision maker discriminated against
her because of her membership in a protected group? Or was it, as the
defendant argues, because of some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason,
usually some malfeasance or deficiency on the plaintiffs part? In a
hiring case, did the plaintiff fail to get the job because the decision
maker took her group status into account in making the challenged
decision? Or did the decision maker believe that some other candidate
would do a better job? The trial of such a case will essentially entail a
battle between two competing causal theories. Seeking to convince the
jury that discrimination is to blame, the plaintiff will portray the deci-
sion makers as discriminators. Seeking to convince the jury that the
plaintiff is to blame, the defendant will do everything possible to make
his or her deficiencies salient.
Why should we expect a jury to approach this social decision task
free from the various forms of intergroup bias that distort intergroup
perception and judgment in other contexts? As we have seen, uncon-
scious stereotypes about members of different social groups create
implicit expectancies in the minds of social perceivers. These expec-
tancies in turn distort the perception, interpretation, and recall of
information about members of the targeted groups, pulling subsequent
social judgments in a stereotype-consistent direction. Stereotypic
expectancies and other forms of intergroup bias also affect causal attri-
bution, causing unconscious distortions in the interpretation and per-
ceived predictiveness of past behavior.
264
Attributing the causes of employment decisions implicates the very
processes of social perception and judgment bound up in the challenged
employment decisions themselves. Unless the demographic characteris-
tics of fact finders vary in some dramatic way from those of the
264. Attributions to stable internal factors increase the predictive value subjectively assigned to
an event. Attributions to transient external factors tend to diminish perceived predictiveness. See
Bernard Weiner et al., Perceiving the Causes of Success and Failure, in ATTRIBUTION 95, 113-17
(Edward E. Jones et al. eds., 1971).
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decision makers, we cannot reasonably expect that the level of inter-
group discrimination reflected in employment decisions will vary in any
meaningful way from the level reflected in discrimination verdicts.
Indeed, the analytical structure and content of disparate treatment adju-
dications, focusing as it does on the plausibility of defendant's proffered
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for a challenged employment
decision, can be expected to potentiate those forms of intergroup bias
caused by stereotypic expectancies. 265 Discrimination adjudications
therefore may be even more vulnerable to cognitive forms of inter-
group bias than the decision tasks which give rise to them.
An employer's determination, for example, whether a particular
employee should be terminated is not much different from a court's
determination whether an employer believed in good faith that a par-
ticular employee deserved to be terminated. Similarly, an employer
judging whether a particular candidate is best qualified for a position is
not particularly different from a court judging whether a particular can-
didate would reasonably have been viewed by a well-intentioned
employer as the best qualified person for a position. Expectancy con-
firmation effects, such as those illustrated in Darley's and Gross's study
discussed above,266 will distort both types of judgments. Thus, there is no
reason to believe that the incidence of stereotype-induced judgment
error in discrimination adjudications will differ in any significant way
from its incidence in employment or educational decision making.
Indeed, if as Darley and Gross suggest, exposure to ambiguous but osten-
sibly diagnostic collections of information potentiates expectancy con-
firmation bias, we can expect disparate treatment adjudications, with
their "information rich texture," to suffer even more from such biases
than hiring or educational admissions decisions, where relatively little
diagnostic information is available and decision makers may be more on
guard against making stereotypic judgments.
In short, from a cognitive process standpoint we cannot expect
disparate treatment adjudications to be any less subject to subtle forms
of intergroup bias than the decisions which give rise to them. Corre-
spondingly, we cannot expect individualized adjudication of disparate
treatment claims to be particularly effective in identifying or redressing
cognitive discrimination. For this reason as for others, disparate treat-
ment adjudication, like the colorblindness model of nondiscrimination
265. The nature and allocation of the parties' burdens of proof in Title VII individual treatment
cases are set out in a trilogy of well-known Supreme Court decisions, and are so frequently recited
that I will not reiterate them here. For those unfamiliar with the relevant doctrine, and with the
significance of the employer's proffer, see St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993);
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
266. See discussion in text accompanying notes 220-221.
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and reliance on an objective concept of merit, is an extremely weak
tool for combating cognitive forms of intergroup bias. We cannot
expect these policies to do the work once accomplished by disparate
impact theory, numerical standards, and the systematic, self-critical
analysis of selection procedures. Unfortunately, when a person is color-
blind, there is simply much he will not see.
CONCLUSION:
SOCIAL COGNITION, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND
THE ECOLOGY OF INTERGROUP BIAS
At its core, our antidiscrimination law and policy suffers from a
cognitive bias known to psychologists as the fundamental attribution
error.267 This interpretive tendency, so pervasive in Anglo-American
culture as to be called fundamental, leads people to over-attribute social
behavior to stable, dispositional traits and to underestimate the causal
efficacy of situational determinants of judgment, behavior, and choice.
Current antidiscrimination theories, most particularly disparate
treatment theory, locate the problem of discrimination within the indi-
vidual decision maker and largely overlook the role of the social envi-
ronment in which those decision makers perceive, judge, and choose. In
other words, when we ask, "Why does discrimination occur?" we tend to
focus on stable, dispositional factors internal to actors we call
"discriminators," rather than on characteristics of the situation in
which decision makers function.
This is a serious mistake. Although we certainly need to know
more, we know a good deal about the conditions under which intergroup
bias will tend to increase or subside. We know, for example, that when
people are asked to make judgments about the characteristics associated
with different classes of people, they are less prone to illusory
correlation-the drawing of unfounded, stereotype-consistent associa-
tions-when they actually view, arrange, and make notes about the data
from which judgments are to be made.268
Similarly, experimental evidence suggests that we can reduce
stereotypic biases in evaluation when evaluative criteria are specifically
identified and when we provide decision makers with a rich body of spe-
cific diagnostic information on which to base decisions. 2 9 Stereotypic
expectancies and other subtle forms of bias will have less influence in
267. See Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the
Attribution Process, 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173 (Leonard Berkowitz
ed., 1977) (coining the term "fundamental attribution error").
268. See Loren J. Chapman & Jean P. Chapman, Genesis of Popular but Erroneous
Psychodiagnostic Observations, 72 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 193, 202-04 (1967).
269. See generally Veronica F. Nieva & Barbara A. Gutek, Sex Effects on Evaluation, 5 ACAD.
MGMNT. Rav. 267, 271 (1980) (reviewing relevant research).
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the evaluation process when decision makers apply less generalized, and
more specific, preferably objective, criteria.2 0 Requiring decision makers
to "consider the opposite," that is, to make the case for the option
they are not selecting may reduce the biasing effect of prior theories,
including the biasing effect of social stereotypes functioning as implicit
schematic expectancies. 27' Similarly, requiring evaluators to summarize
the evidence tending to contradict their conclusions may weaken some-
what the subsequent biasing effect of the implicit theory created by the
evaluation itself.272
We know that whites tend to discriminate less against non-whites
in the allocation of negative sanctions if they know that peers will
monitor and potentially censure their behavior.2 73 Monitoring of this
sort is most effective when individual evaluators are held individually
responsible for outcomes. The diffusion of responsibility associated with
group decision making appears to lessen the impact of review and
potential censure.274
We know that these situational factors affect the likelihood that
cognitive forms of discrimination will occur. But none of this knowl-
edge is incorporated into existing theories of discrimination or into the
models of proof we provide to those fact finders charged with identify-
ing it. Our jurisprudence relentlessly directs these fact finders towards
"discriminatory intent," a stable, trait-like characteristic located
somewhere inside decision makers' minds, functionally detached from
the perceptual environment in which those decision makers perceive,
judge, and choose.
On a larger scale, we also know something about how the composi-
tion and social organization of a particular institution or community
will influence intergroup perception, judgment, and reward allocation.
For example, the presence of a "token" woman or minority does little
to lessen patterns of intergroup bias in an otherwise homogeneous
group. In fact, a "solo" in such a situation operates at a much elevated
risk of discrimination.275
270. On the value of decomposition as a means of reducing evaluation bias, see, e.g., J. Scott
Armstrong et al., The Use of the Decomposition Principle in Making Judgments, 14 ORG. BEHAV.
HUM. PERFORMANCE 257 (1975).
271. See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson, Inoculation and Counterexplanation: Debiasing Techniques
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We also know that simple integration does little to reduce inter-
group conflict. In fact, where intergroup competition is present, con-
tact between groups exacerbates, rather than reduces, intergroup bias.276
At a minimum, for intergroup conflict to subside, members of different
groups must become involved in relationships of cooperative interde-
pendence.2 7 Some researchers argue that even this is not enough: so
long as category boundaries remain salient, even a cooperative inter-
group reward structure will fail to reduce intergroup bias.278 According to
this view, the only way to reduce intergroup discrimination is to lessen
the salience of intergroup distinctions. So long as social category
boundaries remain salient, intergroup discrimination will persist.
And so we are led to the crucial question: how as a society can we
reduce the salience of intergroup distinctions based on race, sex,
national origin, or religion? One thing by now I hope is clear: we can-
not accomplish this objective by simply directing people not to notice
or take these distinctions into account. We cannot accomplish it by
criminalizing discrimination, as some in Congress now seek to doY.2 9 We
cannot accomplish it through even the vigorous enforcement of exist-
ing civil rights protections. They are too weak; they too fundamentally
misapprehend the etiology and natural history of intergroup bias. And
finally, we will not accomplish this objective either by eliminating or by
preserving preferential forms of affirmative action.
For better or for worse, the application of insights from social
cognition and social identity theory complicates rather than simplifies
the affirmative action debate. On the one hand, there is reason to fear
that preferential forms of affirmative action, at least in some contexts,
DISCRIMINATION & RACISM, 127, 134-36 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986); Shelley
E. Taylor, A Categorization Approach to Stereotyping, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING
AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 83, 90-94 (David L. Hamilton ed., 1981).
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277. For research finding a positive effect from cooperative interdependence, see Stuart W.
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discrimination under Sections 703 or 704).
1998] 1331
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
may indeed exacerbate intergroup tensions and perpetuate rather than
reduce subtle forms of intergroup bias. In other words, preferences
appear to do harm as well as good.
On the other hand, insights derived from these fields suggest that
we are not yet ready to abandon preferential forms of affirmative
action for the simple reason that we have nothing adequate with which
to replace them. Neither our political discourse nor our civil rights
jurisprudence reflect an adequate understanding of what intergroup dis-
crimination is, how or what causes it to occur, or what is required to
reduce or eliminate it. We underestimate the stability, subtlety, and per-
niciousness of intergroup bias. Perhaps most importantly, we lack a
coherent theory as to why improving intergroup relations should be a
high priority in American political, economic, and cultural life.
These failures, and the confidence of anti-affirmative action ac-
tivists, derive at least in part from two widely held but ultimately erro-
neous assumptions. The first assumption is that discrimination is
conscious, intentional, and reasonably easy to identify. According to
this view, by monitoring their thought processes, well-meaning, law-
abiding people can and will refrain from discriminating. When discrimi-
nation does occur, it can be readily identified and negatively sanctioned.
Nothing more than vigorous enforcement of existing laws prohibiting
discrimination is needed to pave the way to an equal opportunity
society.
The second assumption holds that absent state-sanctioned or overt
discrimination by private actors (which most would agree are waning),
intergroup relations in the United States will improve or at least remain
relatively tranquil, of their own accord. Intergroup harmony, rather
than intergroup strife, is seen as a kind of default setting, necessitating
little political intervention beyond the enactment and vigorous
enforcement of laws prohibiting overt discrimination.
But tendencies towards intergroup discrimination are much more
subtle, stable, and pernicious than these assumptions or their reflection
in anti-affirmative action rhetoric admit. Social cognition teaches that
much intergroup discrimination is both unintentional and unconscious.
It occurs spontaneously as an unwanted artifact of normal cognitive
functions associated with the processing of information about other
people and can be corrected, if at all, only through further deliberate
mental effort. Social identity theory and related research in experimen-
tal social psychology indicates that the tendencies to assist or excuse
those with whom we feel closely identified and to subordinate the
socially distant are far less tractable than we might wish.
These more subtle, incremental forms of discrimination are diffi-
cult to recognize, and neither our cultural understanding nor our
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jurisprudential models of discrimination illuminate or provide ways to
reckon with them. Without affirmative action, it remains to be seen
how powerfully they will operate to exclude minorities and women from
large segments of the academy, public contracting, or labor markets.
But there is ample reason to fear that the road ahead may be rockier
than Proposition 209's supporters optimistically predict.
One need only consider recent events in Bosnia, recall the burning
cities of the nineteen-sixties, or reflect upon the great humanitarian
disasters scarring human history to recognize that intergroup relations
stand poised in delicate balance. Tensions can flare suddenly, violently,
and with tragic consequences. We may agree that preferential forms of
affirmative action come at a cost. We may aspire to replace them with
something more closely reflecting our highest values and ideals. But to
abandon them now, without an adequate theory of discrimination or
workable equal opportunity policy to replace them, seems a risky course
indeed.
